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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation investigates the long-term determinants of the government bond nominal yields 
of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. It deploys vector error correction (VEC) model to assess 
whether John Maynard Keynes’s view that the central bank’s actions, mainly through short-term 
interest rates and various monetary policy measures, are the key drivers of long-term 
government bond yields over the long-run, after controlling for key economic variables such as 
the inflation rate, GDP growth rate, and government debt- and deficit-to-GDP ratios. The results 
from the models estimated indicate that short-term interest rates are the main drivers of long-
term government bond yields for all three countries thus supporting Keynes’s conjectures in the 
context of Latin American emerging markets. The results also demonstrate that higher 
government debt and deficit ratios do not exert upward pressures on the Brazilian government 
bond yields. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a rise in the Brazilian government debt- and 
deficit-to-GDP ratios lowers the government bond yields. For Colombia and Mexico, some of 
the results from the estimated models are in concordance with the conventional view, but many 
also suggest that the government finance variables do not have statistically significant effect on 
the government bond yields. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Latin American debt trading markets started to develop in 1989 with the 
implementation of the Brady Plan. By the 1980s, many Latin American countries could not 
meet their debt servicing obligations – a period that has been referred to as the “Lost Decade.” 
The Brady Plan, through debt restructuring i.e., reduction agreements, enabled the Latin 
American countries to get credit enhancement, allowing them a greater access to the 
international financial markets. But since then, the Latin American countries have been subject 
to structural adjustment programs proposed by the IMF and the World Bank. In the 1990s, the 
countries of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico still continued to experience episodes of high 
inflation, currency volatility, and debt crises. However, following the turn of the 21st century, 
there has been a major development in the bond markets in most of the Latin American 
countries. As the external financing was declining, the domestic bond markets were developing 
at a high pace. Through the years, the average maturity of the domestic outstanding debt 
lengthened, the institutional collaboration between the Treasury departments and the central 
banks strengthened, and the financial structural framework improved. 
This dissertation investigates as to whether central bank’s actions mainly determine 
Latin American government bonds’ nominal yields through the short-term interest rate. We try 
to answer this question by testing whether short-term interest rates, after controlling for other 
crucial variables, such as rate of inflation, rate of economic activity, and ratios of government 
debt-and deficit-to-GDP, take a lead role in driving long-term interest rates on a long run basis 
since the 2000s. 
There is a substantial amount of literature on the determinants of government bond 
yields. One side of the literature corresponds to the conventional view that higher government 
debt-and deficit-to-GDP ratios exert upward pressure on government bond yields (Ardagna, 
Caselli, and Lane 2007; Baldacci and Kumar 2010; Cebula 2014; Grandes 2007; Gruber and 
Kamin 2012; Lam and Tokuoka 2011; Martinez, Tercenoa, and Teruelb 2013; Min et al. 2003; 
Paccagnini 2016; Perovic 2015; Poghosyan 2012). The other side of the literature represents the 
Keynesian view, which is that central bank’s actions affect the government bond yields, 
primarily through the effect of the policy rates on short-term interest rates and other tools of 
monetary policy (Keynes 1930). Although in the General Theory, Keynes ([1936] 2007) 
addressed the idea that psychological, social and business incentives to investors’ liquidity 
	 7 
preferences are also significant factors in determining the interest rate, he still emphasized that 
there is a direct link between central bank’s actions and interest rates. Following Keynes’s 
notion of ontological uncertainty and his contention that investors extrapolate the future outlook 
from the present, several studies, such as Akram and Das (2014, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2018) and 
Akram and Li (2017a, 2017b, 2018) demonstrate that short-term interest rates are the key 
drivers of long-term government bond yields. This body of literature also addresses that the 
ratios of government debt-and deficit-to-GDP do not have adverse effect on the government 
bond yields.  
This dissertation fills this literature gap by investigating whether Keynes’s conjectures 
are valid in the Latin American emerging markets, specifically, for the countries of Brazil, 
Colombia, and Mexico. It implements vector error correction (VEC) modeling to assess the 
determinants of the long-term government bond yields. The results from the majority of the 
models demonstrate that the short-term interest rate are, in fact, the most important determinants 
of long-term interest rates for all three countries. In addition, some of the results from the 
models for Brazil suggest that, over the long term, an increase in the ratios of the government 
finance variables lowers the government bond yields. These findings align with modern 
monetary theory (Wray 2003, 2012), modern central bank’s operational framework (Bindseil 
2004; Fullwiler 2008), and recent developments in macroeconomic monetary theory (Sims 
2013; Woodford 2001). For Colombia and Mexico, some of the estimations from the models are 
in concordance with the conventional view, but quite a few also suggest that government 
finance variables have hardly any influence on government bond yields. 
This dissertation is organized as follows: chapter 1 presents a theoretical and an 
empirical overview of the literature with regards to government bond yields; chapter 2 describes 
important and recent stylized facts about the economies of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico; 
chapter 3 gives the institutional background of their central banks and their government debt 
markets; chapter 4 describes the data and its sources, and provides a detailed analysis of the 
model of long-term interest rates according to Keynes’s views; chapter 5 presents the 
econometric framework applied in this dissertation, reports the model estimations, and interprets 
the findings, and lastly, the conclusion provides a summary of the main findings and their 
implications for macroeconomic theory and policy along with a discussion of some policy 
remarks. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Theoretical Background 
There are two major strands in the theoretical literature that lay out what explains and 
determines the interest rate. The framework of one strand has been referred to as the real theory 
of interest rate, which finds its roots in Irving Fisher. This framework operates in a so-called 
real exchange economy where a natural rate of interest establishes long-run neutrality of money 
(Fisher 1907, 1930). The other aligns with John Maynard Keynes and his monetary theory of 
interest rate (Keynes [1936] 2007). Since economies are based on monetary production, this 
framework puts an emphasis on liquidity preference, monetary conditions, and financial 
institutions.  
 
Fisher And The New Monetary Consensus 
The central banks of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico abide by the principle of inflation 
targeting – a policy strategy based upon the New Monetary Consensus (NMC) in which the 
main goal is to achieve a stable and low rate of inflation. NMC has its roots in Monetarism and 
in the economic debates of the 1970s that led to the rejection of counter-cyclical policies as a 
way to establish stable economic growth. The basic underlying framework of the NMC is to 
stabilize the so-called “natural interest rate” by managing inflation and inflation expectations 
(Smithin [1994] 2003, 108-17; Tymoigne 2009, 7-13; Wicksell [1898] 1965). The 
understanding is that the natural interest rate is an equilibrium real interest rate that is set in the 
loanable funds market. In this market, savers on the supply side are rewarded by giving up 
present consumption and investors on the demand side borrow funds from the savers.  
This is, in fact, the real exchange economy, which brings us to Fisher’s theory of the rate 
of interest. Fisher’s theory centers on intertemporal consumption preferences by rational 
economic individuals who, given their time preference, decide on what assets to buy (lend) or to 
sell (borrow) that would eventually provide them with the highest rate of return (Fisher 1907, 
36; Fisher 1930, 131). This arbitrage between present and future incomes can be extended in the 
aggregate with regards to a monetary asset and commodity called the real aggregate income, 
with the assumption that there is a representative rate that allows us to compare the rates of 
return (Fisher 1907, 328; Fisher 1930, 45; Kregel 1998, 126-8; Robertson 1940, 84). The 
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arbitrage stops when the rate of return in terms of the monetary asset becomes equal to the rate 
of return on real income: 
 𝑖! = 𝑟! + 𝑝!      (1.1) 
  
In this equation, 𝑖! is the nominal interest rate, 𝑟! denotes the rate of return on real 
income and is often referred to as the natural rate of interest, and 𝑝! stands for the rate of 
inflation. When 𝑖! < 𝑟! + 𝑝!, the investors have an incentive to borrow because the cost of 
credit is lower than the rate of return on non-monetary assets corrected for the rate of inflation. 
As a result, there is an increase in investment and spending, which leads to higher inflation and, 
with that higher inflation expectations. In order to make sure that inflation is on target and that 
expectations of inflation are realized, central banks would tighten their policy by increasing the 
nominal interest rate (Tymoigne 2009, 12-3). Conversely, when 𝑖! > 𝑟! + 𝑝!, the cost of credit 
is greater than the rate of return on non-monetary assets adjusted for the rate of inflation. As a 
result, borrowing falls and inflation declines. Thus, central banks would loosen their policy by 
lowering the nominal interest to manage their inflation targets.  
Before NMC, the central bank’s inflation targeting approach was dominated by 
Monetarism, which proposes targeting of monetary aggregates in order to manage the money 
supply and keep inflation stable (Arestis and Sawyer 2003; Wray 2006). This relates back to the 
loanable funds framework in which monetary conditions cannot influence the natural rate of 
interest. In standard loanable funds market, the interest rate provides an extra return for the 
foregone consumption. This means that the return for savings increases as the interest rate 
increases, which increases the supply of funds in the market. On the other side of the market are 
the investors who make investment decisions based on the marginal product of capital vis-à-vis 
the cost of investing (i.e., the interest rate). Thus, individuals must have lower preference for 
present consumption so that the interest rate can fall, which would make the investments more 
profitable. Consequently, the interest rate is determined in the market through arbitrage by 
economic units adjusting their intertemporal consumption patterns, thus, ensuring that savings 
equals investment. However, Fisher actually believed that the central bank should focus on 
minimizing the “discrepancy between real interest rate and money rate” by managing inflation 
expectations (Fisher 1932, 127). Even before Fisher, Wicksell ([1898] 1965) argued that central 
banks should react to the inflationary/deflationary pressures by adjusting their nominal rate in 
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order to control the natural rate. Unlike the Monetarists, both Fisher and Wicksell favored 
central bank management of interest rates – setting the nominal interest rate to be consistent 
with the interest rate of non-monetary assets. Moving to the present, this associates with the 
current policy objectives of inflation targeting by the central banks. Operating the interest rate 
target to manage inflation expectations has become the dominant goal of monetary policy 
making (Agenor 2002; Bernanke and Mishkin 1997; King 2005; Svensson 1999). 
 
New Monetary Consensus Criticism 
Despite its prevalence, the policy approach of the NMC has been under some criticism. 
Arestis and Sawyer (2003) address the margins of error in forecasting inflation. They also raise 
doubts on central banks adjusting the interest rate with the purpose of achieving zero output gap 
and securing equilibrium between planned savings and planned investment. Palley (2003) points 
out that inflation targeting policy cannot control asset price bubbles. Furthermore, Goodhart 
(2005) and Woodford (2007) question the availability and formulation of the forecasts regarding 
inflation expectations. The harshest criticism comes from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2008) 
who state that models adhering to the NMC are not realistic and should not be used for policy 
analysis.  
Central banks need to put more emphasis on the management of financial imbalances. 
Since central banks can closely target the interest rate, they can promote interest rate stability. 
Large variations in the interest rate operation targets raise uncertainty with regards to the short-
term rate and the long-term rate (Kaldor 1982). Namely, with different maturity terms, financing 
activity can be susceptible to interest rate changes. Moreover, a volatile interest rate 
environment could trigger changes in the long-term rates that eventually impact the values of 
assets and liabilities – causing insolvency problems (Kregel 1998, 130-2; Tymoigne 2009, 45). 
It is very difficult for a central bank to manage inflation since it cannot control the endogenous 
nature of money supply creation. Instead of low inflation, the central bank’s main role should be 
to promote financial stability and a stable yield curve (Hannsgen 2005; Kregel 1998, 2003). 
This dissertation does not argue that monetary policy should be favored over fiscal policy, but 
that a stable term structure can help reinforce a more robust financial structure. This is a 
paramount necessity before implementing any kind of full-employment policy by the 
government (Minsky 1975). 
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The Keynesian Approach  
All of these functions, objectives, and operations of the central bank had been put 
forward by Keynes, who has laid a monetary theory of interest rates. Keynes’s framework puts 
an emphasis on monetary conditions and financial institutions. Keynes was completely against 
the classical views on the rate of interest held by Marshall (1890), Cassel (1903), and Taussig 
(1918) that the marginal productivity of capital and the marginal installment of saving tend to 
converge toward an equilibrium meeting at a common rate of interest. According to Keynes, 
“the rate of interest cannot be a return to saving” since it “is the reward for parting with liquidity 
for a specified period.” (Keynes [1936] 2007, 166-7). Keynes went on to argue that the classical 
theory of interest is a “nonsense theory” since it neglects “the relevance of changes in the level 
of income or the possibility of the level of income being actually a function of the rate of 
investment.” (Keynes [1936] 2007, 180). Keynes also diverges from the neoclassical theory by 
claiming that investment is not only a function of interest rates and that we cannot keep the state 
of investor expectations constant. Investment is affected by fundamental uncertainty, so 
expected profitability of investors and lending institutions play a key role for investment to take 
place.1  
In a monetary theory production economy, there are no perfect foresight rational 
economic units. Instead, there is uncertainty and the economy is driven by the expected future 
proceeds. While assets were perfect substitutes in Fisher’s framework, liquidity preference is a 
concern in Keynes’s theory. Namely, the spread between the short-term and the long-term rates 
of interest is actually determined by the preferences of investors toward liquid or illiquid 
positions (Lavoie 1992, 195; Wells 1983, 533). Money is not neutral, acting as a “lubricant that 
oils the wheels of production and exchange” (Davidson 1994, 14). Money is actually a “real 
factor determining production decisions in a modern economy” (Kregel 1998, 111). Contrary to 
Fisher’s real rate of interest, Keynes has an own rate of interest. In both theories, the interest 
rate is a spot-forward relationship. However, Keynes’ own rate of interest is a relation between 
the spot-forward quantities of an asset (Kregel 1998; Tymoigne 2009, 255-8).  
With respect to the yield curve, the current accepted explanation of the interest rates can 
be found in Fisher’s conjectures regarding “expectations of future goods prices relative to 
present goods prices.” (Kregel 1998, 125). Thus, the expected future inflation rate is the main 																																																								
1 A more detailed analysis of Keynes’s view on the drivers of long-term interest rates with regards to investment 
decisions is covered in the Data and Methodology chapter. 
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determinant of the yield curve. However, the perfectly foreseen rate of inflation neglects the 
impact of interest rates on the price of securities because bondholders, for instance, in 
anticipation of higher inflation, will eventually end up with a lower total real return on the 
investment. The reasoning here is that the higher interest rate, to compensate for the increased 
inflation, erodes the principal value of the bond. Kregel lays out Keynes’s argument against 
Fisher by stating that, “Fisher’s relation goes in the wrong direction since the higher yields 
required to preserve real yields causes capital losses that more than offset the increased interest 
earnings.” (128). For Keynes, the shape of the yield curve depends on the “expectation of 
changes in prices of longer-term bonds” (131). This is different from the Hicksian expectation 
hypothesis, which argues that long-term rates reflect expected future short-term rates, which are 
further determined by future inflation rates. This essentially means that the long rates are in fact 
averages of short-term rates without any reference to potential changes in the assets’ capital 
values due to short-term changes (Hicks [1939] 1946). This would be true if investors were only 
income-risk sensitive and happy to hold securities for a long time because “the fear of income 
loss more than offsets a mild change of capital loss.” (Kahn 1972, 83).  
However, an economy is primarily dominated by financial institutions that have asset 
liability mismatches, which means that changes in capital values play a significant role in the 
structure of the balance sheets (Kahn 1972, 74-5; Kregel 1998, 131; Rezende 2015). Thus, there 
are also capital-risk investors who participate in bond trading, making capital gains and so are 
afraid of interest rate changes (Tymoigne 2009, 65). Fisher’s relation thus portrays an economy 
with economic units, waiting for their real asset returns to be realized that they perfectly 
foresaw. On the other hand, by emphasizing that it was not legitimate to hold the state of 
investor expectations constant due to the notion of uncertainty, Keynes explicitly states that the 
expected rate of return on an asset depends on the expected gains from holding the asset, the 
expected carrying costs in taking a position in the asset, the expected capital gain if the asset is 
sold, and the liquidity premium, which is the reward for “walking away” from a liquid asset to 
an illiquid asset (Keynes [1936] 2007, 222-44). Hence, changes in liquidity preference 
accompany changes in investment decisions. In a Keynesian framework, investors assess their 
expected investment horizon rate of return based on “subjective evaluations about future 
movements of short and long-term rates, holding period, risk preferences, and the degree of 
conviction of those assessments (Rezende 2015, 74). The Keynesian approach, therefore, 
describes the yield curve as the interplay between the expected future long rates relative to the 
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short-term borrowing rate, which properly portrays modern capital markets where the expected 
capital gains of the investors’ levered portfolios are always measured against the cost of 
financing (Kregel 1998, 132).  
Keynes ([1936] 2007), however, was adamant about monetary authorities being 
successful in exerting direct control on the “determinate rate of interest, or more strictly, a 
determinate rate of interest for debts of different maturities” (204). In the Treatise Keynes 
(1930) argued that, “the influence of the short-term rate of interest on the long-term rate is much 
greater than anyone would have expected,” and, that, we should have no doubts in the central 
bank’s ability to “make its short-term rate of interest effective in the market.” (315-24). And 
even though, in Keynes-Kahn it is the expected future long rates that affect the demand for 
short-term debt, as Kregel puts it: 
 
“The shape of the yield curve is determined by expectation of changes in 
long rates relative to the short borrowing rate. Monetary policy, which can 
only influence short rates, can influence the shape of the yield curve and 
thus long rates, to the extent that it is capable of influencing expectations 
of changes in long rates. That is, by influencing the estimates of the future 
that determine present prices.” (Kregel 1998, 132). 
 
 
To support his views, Keynes drew upon the writings of Riefler (1930), who 
demonstrated in numerous Federal Reserve statistical studies that the actual range of 
fluctuations in the long-term interest rates in the United States closely followed the fluctuations 
in the short-term interest rates, and that this similarity is “more than just a merest chance” (115). 
Riefler argued that “monetary forces cause banks and other investors to change their 
participation in the investment markets,” and, as a result, “bond prices and bond yields are 
influenced directly in some measure by the same monetary forces which account for changes in 
short-term money rates.” (116).   
Although Keynes in the General Theory pointed to other factors such as liquidity 
preference, social norms, and business and psychological motives that could affect interest rates, 
he still suggested that there is a strong direct relation between monetary authorities and interest 
rates “if the monetary authority were prepared to deal both ways on specified term in debts of all 
maturities and even more so if it were prepared to deal in debt of varying degrees of risk” 
(Keynes [1936] 2007, 205). Keynes went on to further argue that “a complex offer by the 
central bank to buy and sell at stated prices gilt-edged bonds of all maturities, in place of the 
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single bank rate for short-term bills, is the most important practical improvement which can be 
made in the technique of monetary management.” (206).  
 
The Crowding Out Argument  
The loanable funds market explored earlier also has implications with regards to fiscal 
policy since the “government’s fundamental objective is to borrow a given amount of real 
resources, not a given amount of money.” (U.S. Congress 1952, 690, statement of Milton 
Friedman). When the government decides that it wants to spend, it enters into competition with 
investors to get access to the available pool of savings in order to finance the deficit spending. 
This means that there is a higher demand for the accumulated stock of savings in the loanable 
funds market, which pushes up the natural interest rate thereby discouraging private investment. 
Therefore, it is argued that government spending “crowds out” private investment. This analysis 
has been reinforced with the NMC as monetary policy was given a larger role in influencing 
demand growth (Arestis and Sawyer 2003; Wray 2006). With monetary policy being more 
favored, it was argued that fiscal policy should focus on balancing the government budget 
(Arestis 2009). 
However, in a monetary production economy, savings and investment are not necessarily 
independent as they are in the loanable funds market. Savings cannot occur before income, and 
banks do not need any prior deposits to finance loans. In fact, savings are a passive residual 
determined by disposable income and the marginal propensity to consume. Here we see that in a 
monetary production economy, the demand conditions and the level of economic activity play a 
central role. According to Kalecki’s profit equation2, when the government spends, there is an 
injection of income into the private sector. This improves the state of confidence among 
investors boosting their profit expectations from investment. Kalecki also made a similar 
argument with respect to the national debt, namely, that: 
 
“In the first place, interest on an increasing national debt…cannot be a 
burden to society as a whole because in essence it constitutes an internal 
transfer… Secondly, in an expanding economy this transfer need not 
necessarily rise out of proportion with the tax revenue at the existing rate 
of taxes. The standard rate of income tax necessary to finance the 																																																								
2 Π = 𝐼 + 𝐷𝐸𝐹 + 𝑁𝑋, where Π is aggregate profit, 𝐼 is private investment, 𝐷𝐸𝐹 is government deficit, and 𝑁𝑋 is 
the net exports. The equation is just a simplified version without the workers’ and capitalists’ consumption. Kalecki 
(1954) derived the profit equation in order to explain economic growth and business cycle fluctuations through the 
lenses of income distribution, market structure, and pricing. 
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increasing amount of interest on the national debt need not rise if the rate 
of expansion of the national income is sufficiently high.” (Kalecki [1944] 
1990, 363). 
 
Kalecki’s first point aligns with the arguments put forward by modern monetary theory, 
that, government spends by crediting bank reserves into the system. The second point indicates 
that government spending increases the growth rate as well as the tax receipts. As long as the 
growth rate is above the interest rate, the growth of the debt ratio cannot become unsustainable 
(Wray 2012).  
But before the New Monetary Consensus started to put its stamp on economic policy, the 
Washington Consensus3 in the 1980s had already established an agenda characterized by fiscal 
conservatism in which the central policy goal of the government was balancing the budget and 
achieving a sustainable debt level. In regards to current literature, one of the most well-known is 
the work of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), who have constructed a case study for a set of 20 
developed countries and concluded that when the government debt-to-GDP increases by more 
than 90 percent, the mean and median growth rates fall by 1 percentage point, and in some 
cases, even more than that. There are, however, all sorts of problems with these findings, and 
their whole case study has been dismantled by Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014), who 
demonstrate a number of inconsistencies and methodological errors. The relationship between 
national debt and economic growth rates vary significantly by period and country. For example, 
it could very well be the case that one or two larger-economy countries drive the results for the 
whole set of countries. In addition, Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) criticize Reinhart and 
Rogoff on the basis of non-linearity of their data findings since they separate the countries in 
four data categories in terms of debt-to-GDP ratios (0-30, 30-60, 60-90, >90) across time. The 
fact that they find correlation between higher debt-to-GDP ratio and lower growth rates does not 
imply causation, especially after taking into account that government budget deficits increase 
following a recession which leads to accumulation of public debt. Herndon, Ash, and Pollin 
(2014) demonstrate that countries with debt-to-GDP ratios greater than 90 percent actually have 
positive real average GDP growth rates, which is contrary to what Reinhart and Rogoff claim. 
Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) go on to show that Reinhart and Rogoff’s empirical case study 																																																								
3	A discourse of ideas and policy recommendations that was established following conventional economic 
orthodoxy in the late 1970s in which neoclassical economists adopted neoliberal ideology and were making market-
oriented development prescriptions to the emerging countries (especially Latin America). Deficit reduction and 
inflation stabilization were at the cornerstone of the policy agenda (Bresser-Perreira 2008, 145-74).	
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suffers from coding errors, improper weighting of summary statistics, and selective exclusion of 
available data (258). But despite the serious drawbacks and wrong conclusions, Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s work has generated interest among the mainstream economists who have picked up on 
it and started to implement government fiscal balance and debt ratios to empirically investigate 
their effects on government bond yields.  
 
Empirical Background 
There is substantial amount of empirical literature written on the determinants of 
government bond yields. One portion of the literature does not consider the Keynesian 
perspective and reinforces the conventional view that higher ratios of fiscal balance and 
government debt-to-GDP increases government bond yields. The other portion supports the 
Keynesian perspective. This empirical work emphasizes the important role of the short-term 
interest rates as major drivers of long-term bond yields, and provides some evidence that raise 
doubts about the crowding out arguments put forward by the conventional literature.  
 
The Conventional View 
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998) provide an overview of the standard neoclassical 
loanable funds model as they survey the literature on the macroeconomic effects of government 
debt for the United States and 18 additional advanced countries. Supplemented with analyses on 
historical time trends, they come to the conclusion that fiscal deficits decrease national savings 
and increase aggregate demand. But this eventually has an impact on the long-term interest rates 
as there is an excess supply of government debt which leads to a higher real interest rates. Gale 
and Orszag (2003) also summarize the literature by exploring approximately 60 studies and find 
that half of them demonstrate evidence of crowding out, while the other half of the studies 
shows either no evidence and/or mixed results regarding the effects of government fiscal stance 
on government bond yields.  
There have also been numerous panel data studies. This topic, for example, Ardagna, 
Caselli, and Lane (2007) explore the impact of public debt ratios on long-term government bond 
yields for 16 countries that are in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) during 1960-2002. They find mixed effects because in the non-linear 
specification, the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio on the long-
term bond yields varies from a decrease of 2.4 basis points to an increase of 3.8 basis points. 
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Gruber and Kamin (2012) also analyze the effect of government debt and fiscal balance on long-
term government bond yields for the OECD countries. They implement a panel regression 
during the period 1988-2007 and find that an increase in the fiscal deficit-to -GDP ratio of 1 
percentage point leads to an increase in the bond yields of approximately 7 basis points. 
Similarly, an increase in the net debt-to-GDP ratio exerts upward pressure on the bond yields by 
1 basis point. They also conduct an analysis just for the G-7 countries and find that the fiscal 
effects on yields are approximately double relative to those estimated for the full OECD panel. 
Furthermore, Poghosyan (2012) analyzes the determinants of sovereign bond yields for 22 
advanced countries during 1980-2010 period using panel cointegration techniques. The results 
suggest that in the long run, a 1 percentage point increase in government debt-to-GDP ratio 
leads to an increase in the government bond yields of about 2 basis points. The other most 
relevant determinant according to this study is the potential growth rate as a 1 percentage point 
increase in it leads to a 45 basis points rise in government bond yields. 
There is also a considerable body of literature that includes emerging economies in 
evaluating the macroeconomic determinants of government bond yields and sovereign bond 
spreads. Namely, Baldacci and Kumar (2010) examine the impact of fiscal deficits and public 
debt on long-term interest rates in panel data that includes 31 advanced and emerging market 
economies from 1980-2008 using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). They find that an 
increase of 5 percentage points in the fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio a country could experience its 
long-term interest rate increasing by 100 basis points. By applying country-specific factors, they 
also discover that large fiscal deficits and public debts in countries, with unfavorable fiscal 
conditions, weak institutions, and global risk factors such as limited access to global capital, put 
more substantial upward pressures on sovereign bond yields. Moreover, Perovic (2015) studied 
the impact of government debt and primary balances on long-term government bond yields for a 
panel of 10 Central and Eastern European countries during the period 2000-2013. The results 
indicate a 1 percentage point increase in the government debt-to-GDP ratio (primary deficit-to-
GDP ratio) is associated with a 2.7-4 (12.9-24.3) basis points increase in the government bond 
yields. Min et al. (2003) investigated the determinants of government bond spreads for 11 
emerging economies from Latin America and Asia for the period 1991-1999. Due to the nature 
of the sovereign debt, they put an emphasis on the international channel. Hence, besides using 
inflation rate, GDP growth rate, debt-to-GDP ratio, etc, they also used real exchange rates, 
country’s terms of trade, international reserves-to-GDP ratio, real oil prices, export/import 
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growth rates, debt service to export ratios, current account deficits, and United States Federal 
Reserve funds rates. Min et al. (2003) find that most of the spread is explained by variations in 
liquidity and solvency variables (with the expected signs, for instance, a higher debt-to-GDP 
ratio increases the yield spread), but also that the macroeconomic variables together with the 
Federal funds rate also play a significant role in the determination of the bond spreads. 
Martinez, Tercenoa, and Teruelb (2013) is a more recent paper that has very similar 
methodology and approach to Min et al. (2003) in its investigation of the determinants of the 
sovereign bond spreads for a set of Latin American countries. From the panel framework, 
Martinez, Tercenoa, and Teruelb (2013) discover that terms of trade, inflation, external debt, 
and international reserves are the key drivers of sovereign bond spreads. Additionally, Grandes 
(2007) explores the main macroeconomic determinants of the sovereign bond spreads for 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico over the period 1993-2001. He uses monthly and quarterly data 
for the Emerging Market Bond Index plus the sovereign spread adjusted for consumer price 
index, gross capital inflows, debt servicing ratios, economic activity index, as well as, data for 
real Federal funds rate, US 30-year Treasury bond yields, and global risk aversion index (credit-
rated BB US corporate bond yield as proxy). After implementing feasible GMM least squares 
method, Grandes finds that higher capital inflows (e.g., FIDs) and higher GDP growth reduce 
the sovereign bond spreads, whereas higher debt service to GDP ratios increase the sovereign 
bond spreads. Grandes’s explanation for the last finding is that higher debt servicing ratios force 
the countries to use their domestic resources to meet the outstanding debt thereby having less 
resources for consumption and investment.  
There have also been one-country case studies on the determinants of government bond 
yields. For instance, Lam and Tokuoka (2011) have conducted a detailed overview of the 
worrying limits of the Japanese debt-to-GDP ratio by comparing this ratio relative to other 
developed countries. They propose that the Japanese nominal bond yields are low due to low 
currency risk and high private savings. In addition, Cebula (2014) conducts a more specific 
empirical investigation on the impact of the US federal budget deficit on the real interest rate 
yields on 3-year US Treasury notes and 7-year US Treasury notes. The two-stage least squares 
estimations indicate that, for the period 1972 to 2012 using yearly data, a 1 percent increase in 
the budget deficit (as percentage of GDP) increases the yield on the 3-year US Treasury notes 
and the 7-year US Treasury notes between 7 and 10 basis points, and between 9 and 11 basis 
points, respectively.  
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Some Discussion Regarding The Conventional View Literature 
The structure and composition of the emerging market bonds has changed dramatically 
since the early 2000s. Back then they were considered sovereign debt, even though those bonds 
were issued in foreign currency. Nowadays, the Latin American countries issue most of the 
domestic debt in their own currency. Herein lays the problem with the studies conducted by 
Grandes (2007), Martinez, Tercenoa, and Teruelb (2013), and Min et al. (2003) since they place 
all the emphasis on external data and the spread relative to United States securities. Moreover, a 
lot of the empirical studies mentioned above, namely, Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2007), 
Baldacci and Kumar (2010), Cebula (2014), Gruber and Kamin (2012), Min et al. (2003), and 
Poghosyan (2012), use yearly data and annual averages of the macroeconomic variables, which 
implies a big loss in variation. Another problem with these studies, including Gruber and Kamin 
(2012), is that these are panel data studies with a mix of developed and developing countries; 
every country has a unique monetary and exchange rate regime, as well as different governing 
institutions. Perovic (2015) uses data on tax rates and numerous stock market indices as control 
variables that raises questions on their economic significance. Lastly, Baldacci and Kumar’s 
(2010) choice of using forecasted deficit and debt data following Blanchard (1984) and 
Poghosyan’s (2012) implementation of potential GDP growth rates cast doubts of the reliability 
of those predictive measures.   
Medeiros (2008) was one of the first papers to critically assess external indebtedness. He 
laid out the problems of the financial-export model that led to financial integration, but also 
contributed to high interest rate variability (and dependency on the US interest rate), fiscal 
contraction, and higher default-rate risk due to the external debt, which was necessary in order 
to sustain the continued capital inflows. More recently Caldentey and Vernengo (2016) 
suggested that fiscal restraints in Central and Latin America do not have a significant impact on 
reducing the risks of a crisis, and that excessive fiscal conservatism actually could lead to lower 
growth rates. 
Papers like Eichler and Maltritz (2013) and Jaramillo and Weber (2013) have added to 
the contemporary policy issues surrounding government bonds. Eichler and Maltritz (2013) 
apply a fixed effects model for the Economic Monetary Union member states and, besides 
finding that GDP growth and country’s degree of openness are the main drivers, results also 
indicate that high public indebtedness is not a problem in the long run when the other variables 
are in good condition. This provides some evidence that high public debt does not necessarily 
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cause higher default risk. Jaramillo and Weber (2013) also use a fixed effects model and allow 
their explanatory variables to have various regression slopes based on whether their global 
aversion index is above or below a certain threshold. They find that during tranquil times, bond 
yields are mainly determined by inflation and GDP growth rates, whereas, during higher market 
volatility, bond yields are influenced strongly by the country’s fiscal fundamentals.  
 
The Keynesian View 
Akram and Das (2014, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2018), Akram and Li (2017a, 2017b, 2018) 
have constructed models that consider the Keynesian perspective of long-term interest rate on 
government bonds. Akram and Li (2017a, 2017b) conduct an empirical inquiry for the US 
regarding the determinants of long-term interest rates on US Treasury securities. Akram and Li 
(2017a) employ a bounds testing approach to cointegration and error correction models within 
autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) framework in order to dynamically calibrate the 
relationship between the macroeconomic variables. They find that short-term interest rates are 
the main drivers of long-term interest rates. The results also indicate that higher federal fiscal 
balance ratios reduce the yields on long-term Treasury securities. This finding is also present in 
Akram and Li’s (2017b) paper in which they show that government indebtedness in the US has 
a negative effect on long-term interest rates. They implement vector error correction (VEC) 
modeling and detect that a 1 percentage point increase in the short-term interest rate causes a 64 
basis points increase in the long-term interest rates. This supports Keynes’s views that short-
term interest rates are the primary drivers of long-term interest rates on a long run basis.  
Akram and Das (2014) and Akram and Li (2018) investigate the dynamics of the long-
term Japanese sovereign debt. Akram and Das (2014) use a two-step feasible and efficient 
GMM technique and find that the Japanese government bond nominal yields are extremely 
sensitive to short-term interest rates. They also discover that while the coefficient for the 
inflation rate is positive and significant, it is moderate in magnitude, and that the coefficient of 
the growth of industrial production is positive, but low and statistically insignificant. Akram and 
Li (2018) deploy VEC framework to estimate the dynamics of the long-term government bond 
yields. They discover that an increase in the short-term interest rate by 1 percentage point 
increases the long-term interest rate by 66.8 basis points – therefore, showing that the Bank of 
Japan’s accommodative monetary policy with low short-term policy rates is responsible for 
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keeping the long-term government bond nominal yields low. In addition, the results indicate that 
an increase in the government debt and deficit ratios reduce the long-term interest rates.  
Furthermore, Akram and Das (2018) implement an ARDL approach to explore the 
determinants of the Commonwealth of Australia government bond nominal yields. The results 
from the models reveal that the short-term interest rate is by far the most important determinant 
of the long-term interest rate. In terms of the government finance variables, the estimated 
models indicate some ambiguity; the coefficient of the fiscal balance ratio is small but 
statistically significant, whereas the debt ratio does not manifest any notable effect.  
Additionally, Akram and Das (2017b) implement Keynesian methodology using a 
pooled mean group (PMG) cointgration technique for a set of 11 Eurozone countries. Hence, 
they try to detect what the main determinants of long-term government bond yields are within 
the context of monetary non-sovereign countries. The Eurozone countries have one common 
European Central Bank (ECB) and are forced to issue debt through the international bond 
markets in the euro currency in order to fund their government spending activities. The results 
still demonstrate that the most important drivers of the countries’ government bond yields are 
the short-term interest rates. What is more interesting is that for the mean group, the government 
debt ratio has a negative and significant relation with the government bond yields. An ARDL 
approach is also used to investigate the dynamics between the variables for individual countries. 
The results, overall, reinforce the findings from the PMG panel analysis. This gives credence to 
Keynes’s insights even more because of the fact that the Eurozone countries cannot exert 
monetary sovereignty.  
Akram and Das (2015, 2017a) try to detect whether Keynes’s conjectures about the 
determinants of government bond yields are valid in emerging markets, such as India. Akram 
and Das (2015) employ a two-step feasible and efficient GMM technique and find that changes 
in short-term interest rates, after controlling for changes in inflation rate and growth rate, are 
always positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This provides evidence that 
the Indian central bank’s actions, through the effect of the policy rates on short-term interest 
rates and other monetary policy tools, take a lead role in driving the changes of the Indian 
government bond nominal yields. They also observe mixed results with regards to changes in 
fiscal balance, as some of the models imply a positive relationship while some demonstrate a 
negative one between fiscal deficits and long-term interest rates. Akram and Das (2017a) apply 
an ARDL method in order to examine whether Keynes’s conjectures about India hold over the 
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long-term. The coefficients of the short-term interest seem to be always positive and significant, 
which suggests that, in the long run, short-term interest rates are the main drivers of long-term 
government bond yields in India. Another very interesting finding is that higher debt ratios exert 
downward pressure on the Indian government bond nominal yields. This goes against the 
conventional argument that higher government debt and deficit ratios increase the nominal 
yields of the government bonds. Along these lines, Pham (2014) adopts the empirical 
methodology by Pogoshyan (2012) and studies the determinants of sovereign bond yields with 
regards to 9 emerging Asian countries over the period 1994-2012. Even though it ignores the 
Keynesian framework, Pham (2014) still finds a negative relationship between public debt and 
sovereign bond yields, which does not support the conventional literature.  
Despite Akram and Das (2015, 2017a) conducting an empirical investigation for India, 
an emerging market economy, there has not been a case study that explores the government 
bond nominal yields using Keynes’s insights for the emerging economies in Latin America. By 
applying Keynesian methodology, this dissertation fills the gap in the literature by providing 
empirical evidence that the main determinants of the long-term interest rates for a set of Latin 
American countries are the short-term interest rates. 
 
 
STYLIZED FACTS FOR BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, AND MEXICO 
 
Economic Outlook 
In the last two years growth in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has gained 
momentum following a contraction in 2016 (IMF 2018a, 17). Figure 1 illustrates that Brazil’s 
growth rate turned positive, as the severe recession has come to an end. The growth rate has 
been boosted by the higher commodity prices. Similarly, Mexico has experienced positive 
growth rates due to the buoyant economic growth present in the United States in the current 
business cycle. Colombia, as a smaller country both in terms of size and overall economic 
capacity, has performed relatively well over the years despite the large oil price shock in 2015 
that temporarily muted the healthy, sustained growth.  
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Figure 1. Real GDP Growth by Country (YoY, %) 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, National Accounts Statistics. 
 
Mexico has the largest GDP per capita in LAC with GDP per capita in constant prices of 
18,339.07 US dollars (USD) when adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP). In 2018, Mexico 
registered an unemployment rate of approximately 3.49%. The average GDP growth rate of 
Mexico between 2000 and 2018 had been 3.02% (Table 1).  
Brazil has the 2nd largest GDP per capita in LAC with GDP per capita of 14,312.03 
USD. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate in 2018 was estimated to be 11.8% and between 
2000 and 2018, it recorded one of the lowest average GDP and GDP per capita growth rates in 
the LAC region – 1.38% and 0.51%, respectively. Brazil had been experiencing high growth 
rates until 2010 when the industrial output started to stagnate as a result of overvaluation in the 
exchange rate and reduction in the profit margins (Oreiro and D’Agostini 2017, 27-8). This led 
to a loss of external competitiveness and a decline of investment for the Brazilian manufacturing 
sector. 
Colombia’s GDP per capita is the lowest of all three (13,343.53 USD). In 2018, the 
unemployment rate was approximately 9.2%, which is slightly lower than that of Brazil but still 
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fairly high in relation to the LAC region. In terms of economic performance, Colombia has 
performed better than most LAC countries – generating an average GDP growth rate of 3.93% 
and an average GDP per capita growth rate of 2.74%. 
 
Table 1. Average Economic Growth Between 2000 and 2018 
Country Average GDP Growth Average GDP Per Capita Growth 
Brazil 1.38% 0.51% 
Colombia 3.93% 2.74% 
Mexico 3.02% 1.86% 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database; and author’s calculations. 
 
 
Fiscal Stance 
As a result of the severe downturn, the Brazilian Federal Government in 2015 
implemented a regime called the New Macroeconomic Matrix that was supposed to stimulate 
aggregate demand via fiscal policy. However, as the government increased expenditures to 
alleviate the economy, worries regarding the potential increase in the public debt instigated fears 
within the Ministry of Finance, as well as international institutions like the IMF. The fiscal 
stimulus lasted only until 2015 when the Brazilian Federal Government decided to pursue fiscal 
adjustment and set a target for budget surpluses. This led to economic uncertainty, which was 
exacerbated with the political corruption scandal inside Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil 
company. Public expenditures were cut and GDP growth decelerated even further. However, 
this led to decrease in the government receipts, which eventually meant larger fiscal deficits.  
In Colombia, fiscal expansion depends largely on revenues from the oil sector (Ocampo, 
Malagon, and Ruiz 2017). This is problematic due to the temporary nature of this revenue, as it 
is mostly led by commodity-price-boom periods. Besides the income taxes generated by the 
state-oil company, Ecopertol, revenues from the agricultural and mining production sectors also 
influence the government’s budget plans. There seems to be a perception that these revenues are 
the sole source for the increase in government expenditures. Mexico, which is also an oil-
exporting country, implemented a fiscal economic reform in 2013 that intended to increase its 
tax revenues by 2.5% of GDP, which, by 2015, was supplemented by fiscal deficit limit of 0.3% 
of GDP (Ros 2017, 137-8). Putting a break on fiscal spending led to a dip in GDP growth rates 
post-2015 both for Mexico and Colombia (see Figure 1). 
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The overall fiscal deficit in 2018 had increased for Brazil and Mexico but decreased for 
Colombia. However, large sections of these deficits is driven by net interest payments. The main 
difference between overall and primary balances is that primary balance excludes interest 
payments from expenditure. For countries with a large outstanding government debt that abide 
to the prescriptions set by the Washington Consensus agenda, achieving primary budget 
surpluses is a major policy objective that needs to be enacted. Figure 3 shows the gross and net 
government debt and we can observe that Mexico and, especially Brazil, have larger 
government debt-to-GDP ratios than Colombia, which is considered to have moderate ratios 
according to international standards (Ocampo, Malagon, and Ruiz 2017, 109). Brazil’s gross 
debt as a percent of GDP has reached 88.4% in 2018 and it has seen its overall fiscal deficits 
increase from 7.8% to 8.6% of GDP. Colombia’s gross debt as a percent of GDP saw a slight 
decrease from the year before – totaling 48.7%. Its overall fiscal balance also improved from 
3.0% to 2.7%. Mexico’s gross debt as a percent of GDP in 2018 equaled 53.8% with the overall 
fiscal balance deteriorating by 1.4% - amounting to a 2.5% deficit (see Figures 2 and 3). 
 
Figure 2. Ratios of Government Overall and Primary Fiscal Balance as a Share of 
Nominal GDP by Country (%) 
 
Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor. 
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Figure 3. Ratios of Government Gross and Net Debt as a Share of Nominal GDP by 
Country (%) 
 
Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor. 
 
The agenda to aim and reduce government spending boils down to concerns of the 
crowding out effects, which were already explored earlier in the dissertation. In fact, the Federal 
Public Debt Annual Report for Brazil stated that structural reforms aimed at fiscal balance are in 
urgently need in order to “revert the growth of mandatory spending and to reduce budget 
rigidity, and thus, assure a sustainable debt trajectory.” (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional 2019b, 
slide 24). Moreover, in its Medium Term Fiscal Plan 2018 – Investor Presentation, the 
Colombian Ministry of Finance persists in trying to lower fiscal deficits with adjustments to the 
expenditure and tax revenue mechanism with the aim of lowering the projected net debt 
(Ministerio de Hacienda y Credito Publico 2018, slides 19-23). Similarly, the Mexican Ministry 
of Finance wants to maintain the public debt as a proportion of GDP on a downward trend 
(Secretaria de Hacienda 2019a). The terms fiscal discipline, fiscal consolidation, fiscal 
sustainability, and sound public finances, dominate these quarterly and yearly presentations on 
the country’s economic activity, borrowing plan, and public debt. The mainstream 
understanding is that high levels of public debt expose possible recession shocks – hence, 
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keeping public debt on a downward path remains an appropriate strategy. Governments have 
adhered to these fiscal consolidation plans characterized by expenditure contraction and public 
investment cuts, however, the absence of fiscal stimulus programs could actually become 
counterproductive for the future public debt’s trend (Ros 2017). Slower growth rates could also 
sometimes be the reason why the public debt to GDP has been on a rising trend. 
 
Sectoral Balances 
Ever since the Washington Consensus was established in the early 1980’s, LAC as an 
emerging economic region had always been subject to structural adjustment recommendations 
that included boosting current account surpluses and ensuring fiscal sustainability. 
The episode of falling commodity prices characterized by the oil price shock in the 
second half of 2014 serves as an example that points out the vulnerability of the LAC countries. 
An economic recovery starts to take place with a rebound in oil prices – hence, an improving the 
current account balance. But much before that, it is actually government sector spending that 
reacts in countercyclical fashion to support the weak aggregate demand. However, in addition to 
the balance of payments and the government sector, the private sector is the third component of 
the basic macroeconomic accounting identity. This has to do with the three sectoral balances 
(Godley 1999). We start with basic macroeconomic formula, 
 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑋 −𝑀    (2.1) 	𝑌 stands for aggregate spending (i.e., GDP), 𝐶 is consumption, 𝐼 represents investment, 𝑋 is exports, and 𝑀 refers to imports. We can rearrange the terms and write the following: 
 𝑌 − 𝐶 − 𝐼 = 𝐺 + 𝑋 −𝑀  (2.2) 
 
Further, we can introduce taxes, 𝑇, on both sides of equation (2), so we write: 
 𝑌 − 𝐶 − 𝐼 − 𝑇 = 𝐺 + 𝑋 −𝑀 − 𝑇  (2.3) 
 
However, we also need to take into account the income transfers, 𝑇𝑅!", from one sector, 𝑖, to another sector, 𝑗. Thus, we can extend equation (3) and write: 
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𝑌 − 𝐶 − 𝐼 − 𝑇 + 𝑇𝑅!" − 𝑇𝑅!" + 𝑇𝑅!" − 𝑇𝑅!" == 𝐺 − 𝑇 + 𝑇𝑅!" − 𝑇𝑅!" + 𝑇𝑅!" − 𝑇𝑅!"+ 𝑋 −𝑀 + 𝑇𝑅!" − 𝑇𝑅!" + 𝑇𝑅!" − 𝑇𝑅!" → 𝑁𝐿! + 𝑁𝐿! + 𝑁𝐿! = 0 
     
 
(2.4) 
 𝑁𝐿 denotes net lending, 𝑝 stands for the private sector financial balance, 𝑔 represents the 
government sector balance, and 𝑓 is the foreign sector balance (i.e., current account balance). 
And to clarify, 𝑇𝑅!", namely, is the amount of income transfers going from the government 
sector to the private sector. If the private sector is in surplus, then it is technically lending funds 
to the other sectors; if the government sector is in deficit, then it is spending more than it is 
taking out of the economy in taxation; and if the current account balance is in deficit, then it is 
net borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Hence, the sum of all three sectoral balances must 
net to zero.  
 
Figure 4. Brazil Sectoral Balance 
 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database; and author’s calculations. 
 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 exemplify Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico’s sectoral balances, 
respectively. Note that the current account balance has its sign reversed and given the 
accounting balance, the graphs are basically mirror images. Thus, for the case of Brazil, given 
the negative external balance in the last four years, it is normal for the government to run 
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deficits because that implies private sector surpluses. This scenario is also present in Mexico but 
only for the past decade. In Colombia, on the other hand, given the large current account deficits 
and the small government deficits, the private sector has had to run deficits since 2005. 
Generally, all a fiscal surplus would do is to shift the burden onto the private sector. 
 
Figure 5. Colombia Sectoral Balance 
 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database; and author’s calculations. 
 
For sovereign countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, the government does not 
resemble a household. It is the issuer of its currency and by running deficits, the government 
technically credits bank deposits in the system. When the government spends more than its 
income, it essentially adds net wealth to the private sector (see Fullwiler 2008; Wray 2003, 
2012). Moreover, the government interest payments add to the private sector income, which 
could only induce consumption in the economy. This means higher tax revenues, and thus, 
reduction in the government deficits. The Washington Consensus’s political agenda of forcing 
countries to implement fiscal consolidation generally reduces the net balance received by the 
private sector. 
The governments in LAC are forced to follow specific guidelines regarding how to cut 
back government spending and promote fiscal balance. Tackling the limits of growth of public 
spending includes reforms such as stabilizing pension spending, reducing the government wage 
bill, and putting certain spending caps on health and education. But this fiscal consolidation is 
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not justified as long as the current account has a negative balance. Generally, the net results 
would be negative private sector financial balances. This was the scenario in Brazil in the early 
2000s and 2010s (see Figure 4); in Colombia in the mid-1990s, mid 2000s, and mid 2010s (see 
Figure 5); and in Mexico in the early 1990s, 2008, and 2017 (see Figure 6). Currently, Brazil 
runs a current account deficit of 1.3% of GDP with a government sector deficit of 8.6% of GDP 
– making a private sector financial surplus of 7.3% of GDP. Colombia also has a current 
account deficit of 0.3% of GDP and a government deficit of 2.7% of GDP, which means the 
private sector is running a surplus of 2.4% of GDP. Mexico has a government deficit of 2.5% of 
GDP and by having a negative external balance of 1.3% of GDP, its private sector financial 
balance is positive – totaling a surplus of approximately 1.2% of GDP. 
 
Figure 6. Mexico Sectoral Balance 
 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database; and author’s calculations. 
 
 
Monetary Stance 
Another reason why the Brazilian New Macroeconomic Matrix did not turn out to be 
successful was that the Brazilian Central Bank decided to increase the interest rate post-2015 
due to inflationary pressures (Oreiro and D’Agositini 2017, 27-8). Colombia and Mexico’s 
central bank’s have both been tightening monetary policies following the end of 2015 as a 
response to the oil price shock, currency depreciation, and rising inflation. With a flexible 
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exchange rate mechanism, low and stable inflation was the most relevant macroeconomic policy 
objective (Sawyer 2009). Monetary authorities have to adjust policy rates in order to offset 
inflation increases anchor inflation expectations. Inflation and inflation forecasts are within 
Brazil central bank’s inflation target band while the official interest rate, Selic, is at a historical 
low level of 6.5% (Figure 7). The Colombian central bank has also been able to anchor inflation 
and inflation forecasts (Figures 8). The same holds true for Mexico’s central bank, which, ever 
since 2017, has implemented tight monetary policy (Figure 9).4 
 
Figure 7. Brazil Inflation Rates and Policy Rate (%) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg Terminal; OECD Inflation Forecast. 
Note: The grey lines represent the inflation target band. 
 
 
However, as much as this pursuit of inflation targeting is relevant for central banks 
meeting their objectives, it often time comes with several drawbacks. When they increase the 
policy rates to offset inflation increases, this could lead to disinflation, which makes it harder to 
pay off the public debt and cover the interest payment obligations on the debt. On top of that, 
the increase in interest rates feeds into higher debt servicing costs. Additionally, the higher 
interest rate makes it harder for the central banks to conduct sterilized interventions with the 
help of reserves accumulation. With budget surpluses set as targets and with inflation 																																																								
4 The OECD inflation forecasts are measured in terms of the consumer price index with projections based on an 
assessment of the economic climate in individual countries and the world economy. 
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expectations being anchored within the acceptable target band, the end results could well be an 
even greater increase of the deficits and with that an even higher public debt-to-GDP ratios. 
 
Figure 8. Colombia Inflation Rates and Policy Rate (%) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg Terminal; OECD Inflation Forecast. 
Note: The grey-shaded area represents the inflation target band. 
 
Figure 9. Mexico Inflation Rates and Policy Rate (%) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg Terminal; OECD Inflation Forecast. 
Note: The grey-shaded area represents the inflation target band. 
 
Another aspect to consider is that low and stable inflation is generally accompanied by 
an exchange rate overvaluation. This is problematic for the LAC commodity-based countries 
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because it essentially leads to a loss of external competitiveness, higher imports, and lower 
economic activity (Ocampo, Malagon, and Ruiz 2017; Oreiro and D’Agostini 2017; Ros 2017). 
As a result, current account deficits follow, associated with slower growth rates that could 
potentially lead to larger fiscal deficits.  
 
Public Debt 
Thirty years ago, the composition of LAC public debts looked very different than it does 
today. One of the earlier central development policy prescriptions laid out by the Washington 
Consensus was foreign debt financing. As the credit from global financial markets started 
pouring into the LAC region, countries became vulnerable to high gross capital inflows, which 
lead to higher foreign debt ratios. Thus, high dollarization and capital flight impeded countries’ 
development of “domestically financed credit-investment income process.” (Dodig and Herr 
2015, 183). 
 
Composition By Currency 
The fact that developing countries were financing their debt through credit denominated 
in foreign currency is often referred to in the literature as “original sin” hypothesis (see Das et 
al. 2010; Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza 2003). The idea is that there is a currency 
mismatch as the debtors’ revenues are in their respective domestic currency but their 
repayments of the principal and the interest on the existing debt are in foreign currency. Once 
the foreign debt amounts to worrying levels, investors start to question a country’s ability to 
meet debt obligations – leading to domestic liquidity and solvency problems (Bresser-Perreira 
2015). The pressure on the currency builds up, the refinancing costs increase, and the default 
probabilities rise. The country then enters a period of Ponzi scheme finance, an expression 
articulated by Hyman P. Minsky, in which the country’s government indulges in additional 
indebtedness to cover both the interest rate and the principle obligations (Minsky 1982).  
Starting in 1995, there was a gradual change in the composition of domestic public debt. 
Besides phasing out exchange-rate bonds (to reduce exchange rate risks) and short-term bonds 
(to lengthen the maturity of the debt), and recently issuing less inflation-linked bonds (because 
the inflation rate has generally stabilized), countries in the LAC region have significantly 
decreased their debt exposure to foreign currency (Das et al. 2010; Turner 2002).  
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Figure 10. Composition of Brazil’s Public Debt by Currency (% of GDP)5 
 
Source: BIS Debt Securities Statistics; IMF World Economic Outlook Database and author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 11. Composition of Colombia’s Public Debt by Currency (% of GDP) 
 
Source: BIS Debt Securities Statistics; IMF World Economic Outlook Database and author’s calculations. 
 
The latest data from 2018 in Figure 10 indicates that Brazil’s foreign currency-
denominated debt accounted for only 11.7% of the total government debt. In Colombia and 																																																								
5 Domestic (local) currency debt is measured by amount outstanding of domestic debt securities as percentage of 
GDP, while foreign currency debt is measured by amount outstanding of international debt securities as percentage 
of GDP. 
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Mexico, on the other hand, the size of the foreign debt is larger as it encompasses 37.5% and 
32.8% of the total government debt, respectively (Figures 11 and 12). Nevertheless, the switch 
from international to domestic debt securities had been profoundly large, especially in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, making most of the LAC’s stock of debt to be denominated in domestic 
currencies (Turner 2002). At this point, the domestic currency debt markets have expended to 
such an extent that there are numerous global bonds that are denominated in local currencies and 
are traded in the international capital markets.  
 
Figure 12. Composition of Mexico’s Public Debt by Currency (% of GDP) 
 
Source: BIS Debt Securities Statistics; IMF World Economic Outlook Database and author’s calculations. 
 
Composition By Holders 
The investor base usually comprises pension funds, mutual funds, financial corporations 
and banks, as well as foreign and retail investors. Each of these institutional investors has a 
different time horizon. The so-called market makers such as day traders, hedge funds, and 
arbitrage funds, have a very short-term horizon. Mutual funds, venture capital, and banks 
typically operate in the medium-term. Lastly, investor groups such as pension funds and 
insurance companies, operate on a long-term horizon. All of these investors have different 
liability profiles so a well-established, well-functioning domestic bond market with various 
maturity instruments is instrumental for efficient investment and financing activities. Besides 
reducing the financing costs, the government debt managers are also responsible for meeting the 
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financing needs of the investors (Das et al. 2010, 372-4). Namely, the pension funds with their 
long-term investment horizon tend to have a relatively illiquid profile, and therefore, they buy 
illiquid bonds and sell liquid issues (Turner 2002, 6). Another positive thing about domestic 
currency-denominated debt is that if the underlying conditions of the debt financing deteriorate, 
a greater share of the burden is passed onto the investors (Pettis 2001, 169).  
 
Figure 13. Composition of Brazil’s Domestic Public Debt by Holders 
 
Source: Secretaria Do Tesouro Nacional, Brazilian Federal Public Debt, Investor Presentation. 
(http://tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/documents/10180/268570/Kit_Ingles_06.03.17/28b36130-9c0f-417a-a7f6-
411fa5400de8)  
 
However, as one can understand from all of this, government public debt should have a 
well-diversified composition of holders. Institutional investors, through their operations in the 
capital markets, could sometimes be a source of vulnerability for the yield structure and the 
liquidity in the system. It is true that the public debt managers intervene in the auctions by 
buying and selling securities, but it is still relevant for the composition of the domestic public 
debt to be sufficiently diversified so that the potential liquidity problem does not translate into a 
solvency problem. It can be seen from Figures 13, 14, and 15 that the composition of Brazil, 
Colombia, and Mexico’s domestic public debt, respectively, is diverse enough. One key risk 
present in both Colombia and Mexico’s public debt composition is the high share of debt being 
held by non-resident holders. 
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Figure 14. Composition of Colombia’s Domestic Public Debt by Holders 
 
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Internal Financing Office; and author’s calculations. 
(http://www.irc.gov.co/webcenter/ShowProperty?nodeId=%2FMHCPUCM%2FP_MHCP_WCC-
139962%2F%2FidcPrimaryFile&revision=latestreleased) 
 
Figure 15. Composition of Mexico’s Domestic Public Debt by Holders 
 
Source: Banco de Mexico; and author’s calculations.  (http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultarDirectorioInternetAction.do?sector=7&accion=consultarDirectori
oCuadros&locale=en) 
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Government Bond Yields 
One of the main arguments the IMF makes in its Country Reports regarding prudent debt 
management is that it keeps investors confident. The IMF’s views are based on the crowding out 
argument and thus, as the deficit- and debt-to-GDP ratios exceed a certain threshold, 
governments have to implement austerity measures by reducing public expenditures. In other 
words, the conventional view holds that improvement in the fiscal balance would keep 
government bond yields low. However, this is not necessarily true since government spending 
increases the reserves in the system held by the central bank, putting downward pressure on the 
policy rate. This makes the short-term interest rates decline, thus catalyzing the banks to seek 
long-term bonds with higher yields (Akram and Li 2017b, 2018). Eventually, this leads to lower 
long-term interest rate, which makes a possible argument for crowding in mechanism. 
 
Figure 16. Government Bond Nominal Yields by Country 
 
Sources: Bloomberg Terminal; OECD Main Economic Indicators, Finance; and author’s calculations. 
Notes: The yield on a 2-year bond is also depicted, but only for descriptive purposes.  
 
Figure 16 portrays the evolution of the long-term government bond nominal yields. After 
2010, Brazil’s yields were on a declining trend but increased substantially right before the onset 
of the 2015 recession. After reaching a peak at the end of 2015, the yields started to decline 
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again, with the 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year yields in January 2019 being equal to 7.52%, 8.11%, 
and 9.02%, respectively. Colombia’s and Mexico’s yields, on the other hand, have been on a 
steady declining trend. Currently, Colombia’s yields amount to 5.55%, 6.13%, and 7.03%, for 
the 3-year, 5-year, and 10-year government bonds, accordingly. It is important to keep in mind 
that generally the government bonds of longer maturity have higher yields compared to 
government bonds of shorter maturity, which is due mostly because of the certain risk premium 
adjusted for the longer maturity bonds. However, in some cases this risk premium may be very 
marginal. For example, Mexico’s latest values for the 2-year, 5-year, and 10-year bonds 
correspondingly have yields of 8.48%, 8.54%, and 8.64%.  A careful look at Colombia’s yields 
though, one can note a spike in the trend. The reason for this was probably the heightened 
uncertainty in the financial environment since Colombia has a high percentage of non-resident 
holders of its public sector debt as well as somewhat high foreign currency debt composition.  
 
Figure 17. Rate of Inflation and Government Bond Nominal Yields by Country (%) 
 
Sources: Bloomberg Teminal; OECD Main Economic Indicators, Finance; and author’s calculations. 
 
The declining trend of Colombian and Mexican yields came to a halt as inflation 
gathered steam in 2016-17. Figure 17 traces the coevolution of inflation and government bond 
yields, and one can note in the bottom chart that inflation has certainly played a role for the 
	 40 
movement of the yields. For Brazil, the movement of inflation parallels very accurately the 
movement in the nominal yields. In addition, for Colombia and Mexico, the decline in nominal 
bond yields has largely been on trend with the overall fall in inflation. Historically, bond 
nominal yields are higher than inflation and the fact that yields move in tandem with the rate of 
inflation is understandable because investors tend to be compensated for inflation. Another 
relevant variable that enters the scheme in the evaluation of purchases and sales by investors in 
the bond market is the overall GDP growth rate, i.e., the country’s economic activity. More on 
this will be covered in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
 
Figure 18. Scatterplots of the Government Bond Nominal Yields and the 3-Month 
Treasury Bill Rates 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal; and author’s calculations. 
Note: For more detailed description of the data and the notations please refer to Table 3. 
 
Nevertheless, the main argument of this dissertation centers around the empirical 
regularities that occur between the short-term and the long-term interest rate on government 
bonds. Figure 18 exhibits the scatterplots of the nominal yields of countries’ long-term 
government bonds of various tenures and 3-month Treasury bills (money market rates). Figure 
19 displays the scatterplots of the year-over-year percentage point changes in the nominal yields 
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of the countries’ long-term government bonds of various tenures and 3-month Treasury bills. 
Figure 1A shows the scatterplots of the nominal yields of long-term government bonds of 
various tenures and the central bank’s policy rates. Figure 2A presents the scatterplots of the 
year-over-year percentage point changes in the nominal yields of long-term government bonds 
of various tenures and the central banks’ policy rates. 
 
Figure 19. Scatterplots of Year-over-Year Percentage Point Changes in the Government 
Bond Nominal Yields and the 3-Month Treasury Bill Rates 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal; and author’s calculations. 
Note: For more detailed description of the data and the notations please refer to Table 3. 
 
The scatterplots reveal strong and positive correlations between the short-term interest 
rate on Treasury bills and the long-term interest rate on the government bond yields. Moreover, 
there are positive correlations between the year-over-year percentage point changes in the short-
term interest rates and the year-over-year percentage point changes in the long-term interest rate 
on the government bond yields. The positive correlations between the levels of the nominal 
yields of government bonds and 3-month Treasury bills is stronger than the positive correlations 
between the year-over-year percentage point changes in the nominal yields of government 
bonds and 3-month Treasury bills. The strong, positive correlations between the nominal yields 
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of government bonds and 3-month Treasury bills are weaker for a higher maturity of the bond. 
The positive correlations between year-over-year percentage point changes in the nominal yields 
on government bonds and 3-month Treasury bills are also weaker for a higher maturity of the 
bond. All of this analysis holds true for the correlations between the levels (and the year-over-
year percentage point changes) in the nominal yields of government bonds and the central 
bank’s policy rates. These observations give credence to our argument that short-term interest 
rates are actually the main drivers of government bond nominal yields for the countries of 
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND FOR BRAZIL, COLOMBIA, AND MEXICO 
 
Central Bank Targets And Objectives  
In the early 2000s, most of the LAC adopted an inflation-targeting regime. Conducting 
monetary policy is done on the premise of “hitting” a certain inflation target. The central banks 
of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, all abide by the inflation-targeting regime as all of their 
mission statements revolve around ensuring low inflation and stability of the currency’s 
purchasing power. All central banks are independent, transparent, and accountable to the public 
since these are all necessary requirements for the efficient conduct of monetary operation within 
the country’s constitutional and legal mandate.  
Banco Central do Brasil (2019), Banco de la Republica (2019), and Banco de Mexico 
(2019a, 2019b, 2019c) provide an abundant amount of information, legal documents, and 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) series papers that pertain to monetary policy and public 
debt management. The Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) of Banco Central do Brasil has the 
authority to set the policy (reference) rate. The interest rate target set by Copom is the target for 
the Selic interest rate. Selic (Sistema Especial de Liquidacao e de Custodia) stands for Special 
System for Settlement and Custody in which the interest rate target is the benchmark for 
overnight interbank loans collateralized by government securities. In fact, approximately 96% of 
the domestic bonds are registered with and traded on the Selic. In Colombia, it is the Board of 
Directors of Banco de la Republica (BDBR) that adjusts the short-term liquidity interest rate, 
which is the benchmark interest rate for intervention in the money market. Similarly, in Mexico, 
the Governing Board of Banco de Mexico (2019c) conducts monetary policy stance by setting 
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its interest rate target (“tasa de fondeo”) on the overnight bank funding operations. Before the 
“tasa de fondeo”, from 1995 to 2007-8, Banco de Mexico had an operational target level for the 
bank’s daily balances (“corto”). This worked well for some time because in a period of 
decreasing inflation, a target level for banks’ balances at the central bank allowed interest rates 
to decline in concordance with inflation expectations (Banco de Mexico 2008). Once low and 
stable inflation was achieved, “corto” was substituted by “tasa de fondeo,” through which, like 
most other central banks, providing or withdrawing liquidity through Open Market Operations 
(OMOs) to set the policy rate near the operating target became the standard monetary policy.  
However, the monetary authorities’ decision to adjust their policy rate depends on 
inflation rate deviations from the acceptable target band. The monetarists tend to believe that 
ensuring price stability by adjusting the interest rate would lead to sustained growth that 
generates employment. Instead of pursuing these heroic goals, central banks should try and 
direct their attention more to their operations in the bond market. Through collaboration with the 
Ministries of Finance (Treasury and/or Fiscal Budget Board/Committee), central banks can 
effectively manage a stable yield curve and positively impact the public debt financing 
operations.  
 
Domestic Bond Markets  
Almost all countries are prone to some kind of yearly government plans i.e., annual 
borrowing requirements, which establish the structure of the public debt operational 
management. The National Treasury Secretariat (STN) is part of the Ministry of Finance and it 
is responsible for managing the Brazilian federal public debt. In Colombia, the General 
Directorate of Public Credit and National Treasury (DGCPTN) is in charge of structuring and 
directing the national public debt. The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), through 
Banco de Mexico as its financial agent, is the responsible government body for the Mexican 
government bond market. The main objectives of all the public debt management government 
bodies include smoothing the maturity structure, increasing the average maturity of outstanding 
debt, managing the yield curve, and increasing the liquidity of public bonds in the secondary 
market.  
The Brazilian federal public debt is one most liquid bond markets among the emerging 
markets. Most of it is denominated in Brazilian reais. The Mexican federal public debt is also 
very liquid and just like the Brazilian bond market, the Mexican bond market offers a wide 
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range of securities. Brazil’s public debt is composed of, more or less, an equal percentage share 
of fixed-rate, floating-rate, and inflation-linked bonds (Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, 2019b). 
Mexico, for instance, has similar distributional composition of fixed-rate, inflation-linked, and 
floating-rate bonds (Secretaria de Hacienda 2019b). Colombia, on the other hand, has a less 
diverse range of securities with domestic federal public debt consisting of approximately 65% 
fixed-rate peso bonds and 30% fixed-rate real value unit (UVR) bonds, with the rest of the 5% 
being either inflation-linked bonds and/or short-term funding bonds (Banco de la Republica 
2019). Compared to Brazil, Colombia and Mexico have higher foreign currency-denominated 
debt, but this amount is much lower than it was in the late 1990s (see Figures 11 and 12). Yet, 
all three countries have successfully extended the average maturity of the government’s 
domestic securities by issuing long-tem, fixed interest securities, ranging from 2- and 3-year 
bonds all the way to 10- and even 30-year bonds in the case of Brazil and Mexico.  
 
Securities  
Brazil has a high number of bonds issued in public offerings, namely, National Treasury 
Bills (LTN), National Treasury Notes-Series F (NTN-F), Financial Treasury Notes (LFT) with 
rates pegged to the Selic rate, and National Treasury Notes-Series B (NTN-B), indexed to the 
Consumer Price Index. These bonds operate at different vertices of the yield curve as they vary 
in terms of their maturity issuance structure. For instance, LTN are bonds that range in the 
short- and medium-term (i.e., from 6 months to 4 years), while NTN-F series bonds range 
within the longer-term structure spectrum (Banco Central do Brasil 2019; Secretaria do Tesouro 
Nacional 2019b). There are other bonds such as the National Treasury Bonds (BTN) that can 
have a maturity of up to 25 years.  
The Colombian bonds are less complicated. All of them are class B Treasury bonds 
(TES B) and they can be separated into two categories. One category includes TES bonds that 
are used in the short-term auction as they are issued for the sole purpose of funding temporary 
Treasury operations (TCO). Most of these are 90-day peso-denominated TES B. The other 
category of TES bonds comprises of fixed-rate Colombia peso-denominated bonds and fixed-
rate UVR-denominated bonds. Both of these are issued in the long-term auction with the 
objective of meeting the public debt borrowing requirements (Ministerio de Hacienda y Credito 
Publico 2019). The peso-denominated TES B can be placed with maturities ranging from 1 year 
to 10 years.  
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The government securities in Mexico range from 28 days to 30 years of maturity. The 
short-term securities encompass Cetes and Bondes bonds. Cetes are zero-coupon Federal 
Treasury Certificates that can be issued with maturities of 28 and 91 days, 6 months, and 1 year. 
Bondes are floating-rate Federal Government Development Bonds with maturities of 1, 3, and 5 
years. Bonos are fixed-rate Federal Government Development Bonds with maturities ranging 
from 3 years to 30 years. And lastly, Udibonos are Federal Government Development bonds 
denominated in inflation-indexed investment units, UDIS, and can be of a 3-, 10-, or 30-year 
maturity (Secretaria de Hacienda 2019b).  
 
Auctions (Primary Market) 
Domestic public debt securities are issued in the primary market in which auctions can 
operate through multiple or unique price discovery frameworks. Price discovery refers to the 
auctioning process in which buyers and sellers simultaneously arrive at a particular transaction 
price for, in this case, a government security. Every auction starts off with the amount and price 
for purchases and sales of the securities. Once the auction closes, the government’s debt 
management organization sorts the bond between the bidders, either through a multiple price 
procedure or through a uniform price mechanism, until it has raised its targeted financing needs 
(Banco Central do Brasil 2019; Banco de la Republica 2019; Banco de Mexico 2019a). In 
multiple-price auctions the winning bidder pays the price higher than or equal to his own stated 
bid. In uniform-price auction, often referred to as Dutch style auction, bidders pay the price that 
is equal to the highest rejected bid (cut-off price) at which market clears the issuance.  
In Brazil, Selic is the platform in which the BCB conducts auctions used for National 
Treasury’s public offerings as well as open market operations. Commercial and investment 
banks, broker houses, mutual and pension funds have the right to participate in the Selic, which 
is technically the central bank’s electronic system (Banco Central do Brasil 2019). The STN 
management of the federal public debt has to comply with the Annual Financing Plan (PAF), 
which states the governments borrowing needs. Most of the issuances take place in a 
competitive manner and it is the responsibility of the National Treasury to indicate an annual 
calendar of the auctions that will be held and the securities that will be offered, along with the 
settlement dates and their respective type and maturity profiles. The auctions are announced and 
held through the Public Offer System-Ofpub. (Banco Central do Brasil 2019). The competitive 
placement is characterized by the direct participation of dealers, who are financial institutions 
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accredited by the National Treasury Departments with the goal of promoting efficient primary 
issuances of the public bonds. The STN also issues securities through noncompetitive 
placement, which is direct issuance for specific aims (namely, securitizing federal public debt), 
and through Tesouro Direto, which are direct sales to individuals (Banco Central do Brasil 
2019). In Brazil, the issuance in the auctions can take place through either the multiple price 
structure or the unique price scheme. 
The National Government in Colombia uses the structure of Dutch auctions (Ministerio 
de Hacienda y Credito Publico 2019). The DGCPTN establishes the cut-off rate along with the 
regulatory framework of the auctions. The offers from the auction are ranked in descending 
order and all the offers are awarded at the rate at which the auctions are completed. The bid 
offers that are below this cut-off rate are denied. DGCPTN has a proactive issuance strategy 
aimed at providing liquidity and reducing costs for the Nation’s budgetary appropriations 
defined in the Nation’s Financial Plan. Since Colombia, compared to Brazil and Mexico, does 
not have much proficiency and depth of the domestic bond market, the National Government 
through the DGCPTN has implemented a Market Maker Program. This program has helped in 
the enhancement of the issuance of public debt securities and regulatory financing conditions 
that takes place in the primary auction market (Ministerio de Hacienda y Credito Publico 2019). 
One of the main points emphasized by the Mexican Ministry of Finance in the latest 
Annual Borrowing Plan is the financing of the government’s needs primarily through domestic 
debt markets. Besides the primary securities auction program already in place, the Ministry of 
Finance has tried to include new reference rates by performing syndicated auctions (Secretaria 
de Hacienda 2019b). The idea behind the syndicated bond offering is that the government pays a 
certain group of institutions (typically banks that are primary dealers) in the primary market to 
boost the demand from the other groups of investors participating in the auction. If some 
amount of the bond offer is not sold, the banks buy the rest of the amount thus enabling the 
government as an issuer to raise the full amount of bond offer (McCrum, Hale, and Allen 2017). 
Mexico, just like Colombia, also has a Market Makers Program that has the objective of 
increasing liquidity in the local currency bond market. Furthermore, Mexico implemented 
Cetesdirecto, which is a government program that allows the investors a more efficient 
purchase/sale of government securities available on the auctions. This government program 
essentially manages the direct sale to individuals on the primary market (Secretaria de Hacienda 
2019a). 
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The Collaborative Nature Of Fiscal And Monetary Operations 
It is difficult to separate the fiscal and the monetary authority operations in the bond 
market since by being the government’s banker (i.e., the Treasury’s fiscal agent), the central 
bank plays an integral role in the primary and the secondary market. The central banks conduct 
the Treasury’s payments by checks or by credits to bank accounts (Wray 2012, 102). On top of 
that central banks run the payments system and maintain par clearing as individual banks have 
accounts at the central bank for clearing with each other. Although it is mostly the STN’s 
responsibility to manage issuances and redemptions of public securities, Banco Central do 
Brasil effectively is the manager of the Selic, carrying out auctions held by STN to buy or sell 
securities. Besides the outright purchases and sales and the repurchase agreements (repos), 
Banco Central do Brasil provides an even greater liquidity to the secondary market through the 
settlement system because Selic also acts as a facility for an outright purchase of intraday repos. 
For instance, a repo transaction with Banco Central do Brasil requested by a settlement bank on 
the clearing platform to generate additional liquidity will be automatically swept back to the 
Selic. These operations take place via the electronic system Offer to Dealers (Ofdealers) where 
auctions are held exclusively with financial institutions (e.g., banks, saving banks, brokers, and 
securities distributors) authorized to operate with Banco Central do Brasil Open-Market 
Operations Department (Banco Central do Brasil 2019). 
In Colombia, Law 31 prohibits Banco de la Republica from offering credits and 
securities to entities. There is an exception, though, in the case of lack of liquidity. Banco de la 
Republica can step in as the lender of last resort to temporarily assist credits to the financial 
institutions. In addition, under the Constitution, Banco de la Republica can operate freely on the 
secondary market by purchasing/selling government bonds (Banco de la Republica 2019). 
Banco de la Republica has a profound significance when it comes to the payment system 
structure, stability of the financial system and channeling monetary indicators in the markets. It 
oversees the Deposit Account System (DAS), a denomination value payments system in which 
operations between financial intermediaries take place through electronic means. Moreover, it 
administers the Central Values Deposit (DCV) and the Electronic Negotiation System (ENS), 
through which public debt are monitored (Banco de la Republica 2019). 
The Mexican Ministry of Finance, through Banco de Mexico, carries out liability 
management operations, namely, repurchase agreements and joint repurchases with additional 
issuances (Secretaria de Hacienda 2019a). Banco de Mexico provides liquidity to the national 
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payment system by managing the accounts of the Mexican financial agents through the Account 
Holders Service System (SIAC). Moreover, the primary auctions of government securities are 
carried out through an electronic system that is developed and managed by Banco de Mexico. It 
also has the capability in overseeing the securities market trading volume (Banco de Mexico 
2019a). Besides regulating the liquidity of Mexico’s financial system, Banco de Mexico 
controls the securities clearing house (INDEVAL), which is the Mexican delivery-versus-
payment system that serves as a private depository institution (Banco de Mexico 2019a). Banco 
de Mexico also reports to the public the average transaction-amount-weighted interest rate for 
its repo operations with government securities.  Banco de Mexico, just like Banco Central do 
Brasil and Banco de la Republica, conducts it OMOs on the secondary market through repo and 
reverse repo arrangements. Depending on the market liquidity needs, Banco de Mexico can 
auction credits (inject liquidity) or deposits (withdraw liquidity). Amounts and interest rates of 
one-day maturity operations are settled through INDEVAL.  
 
Monetary Sovereignty  
The institutional framework demonstrates that Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have 
modern governments each with a Treasury department and a central bank, which is the 
government’s bank making and receiving payments for the government. Table 2 demonstrates 
all the requirements for a country to have full control over its monetary sovereignty. By the end 
of the 20th century, almost all Latin American countries have introduced a floating exchange rate 
regime: Mexico in 1995; Brazil and Colombia in 1999 (Damil and Frenkel 2017). A floating 
exchange rate regime has reduced the solvency risk because earlier, under the fixed exchange 
rate regime, countries in the LAC region had trouble putting unemployed domestic resources to 
work and were susceptible to exchange rate crises characterized by foreign currency shocks and 
large external debts (Sardoni and Wray 2007).  
In a country with a monetary sovereignty regime, the fiscal authority functions in 
concordance with the monetary authority. The central banks of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico 
ensure that their Treasury’s fiscal operations do not move the overnight interest rate away from 
the target (Wray 2012, 103-5). The Brazilian, Colombian, and Mexican governments are issuers 
of their own currency and they spend by crediting bank accounts. The tax payments, on the 
other hand, result in debits to bank accounts (Wray 2006). In addition, since Brazil, Colombia, 
and Mexico have low amounts of foreign currency-denominated debt, their governments do not 
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have third party IOUs (“I owe you”) to service their own debt (Sardoni and Wray 2007). These 
operations demonstrate that the annual borrowing needs and requirements set by the Brazilian 
National Treasury Secretariat, the Colombian General Directorate of Public Credit and National 
Treasury, and the Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit do not have much relevance, 
except perhaps for statistical purposes demanded by the IMF. 
Government spending can lead to excess reserve positions due to the increase in net 
credits. Banks start to offer the excess reserves in the overnight lending market – thereby, 
bidding down the overnight interest rates. But, the central bank could easily intervene in the 
market through bond sale operations to drain the excess reserves, and hit its desired target. Even 
the mainstream macroeconomic body of literature (Bindseil 2004; Sims 2013; Woodford 2001) 
has addressed this fiscal-monetary operational framework in a monetary sovereignty regime. 
Bond sales (or purchases) are not borrowing operations, but rather they represent a coordinated 
mechanism by the Treasury and the central bank by which the Treasury can always sell 
securities and get deposits at the central bank in order to spend (Fullwiler 2008; Wray 2003, 
2006, 2012). This means that central banks can directly influence the long-term interest rates on 
government bond yields. They could do so by purchasing long-duration government bonds from 
dealers and financial institutions, yield curve control, and policy pronouncements (Akram and 
Li 2018).  
 
Table 2. Summary of Monetary Sovereignty Institutional Framework 
Country 
Their own 
currency and 
national 
Central Bank 
Ability to 
tax and 
spend in 
their own 
currency 
The tax liabilities 
of the private 
sector to the 
governments can 
be met solely by 
the payments in 
their own 
currency 
Exchange-
rate regime 
Monetary 
policy 
objective 
Foreign 
currency-
denominated 
debt 
Brazil 
Brazilian Real 
(Banco 
Central do 
Brasil) 
Yes Yes Floating Inflation targeting Almost none 
Colombia 
Colombian 
Peso (Banco 
de la 
Republica) 
Yes Yes Floating Inflation targeting Low 
Mexico 
Mexican Peso 
(Banco de 
Mexico) 
Yes Yes Free floating Inflation targeting Low 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Based on the exploratory facts that we have discussed in the chapters beforehand, it 
follows that Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico are countries with sovereign currencies, have most 
of their debt issued in their own currency, have the ability to tax and spend in their own 
currency, are under a floating exchange rate regime, and have central banks that set the policy 
rate through forward guidance, communication tools, and asset purchases/sales. These features 
create an economic environment with monetary sovereignty in which the central banks’ 
operations profoundly influence the country’s long-term nominal domestic currency government 
bond yields.  
 
A Simple Model Of Long-Term Interest Rates 
The fact that Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have most of their government debt 
securities denominated in their particular domestic currencies allows us to construct a concise 
model so that by assumption we can ignore variables such as exchange rates (vis-à-vis the US 
dollar), Federal Reserve Funds rates, current accounts, capital controls, dollar reserves, US 
Treasury yield spreads, etc. Henceforth, within this level of abstraction, we can start by saying 
that the long-term government bond yield depends on the short-term interest rate and the 
forward rate.6 The yield of a long-term bond, 𝑟!", depends on the short-term interest rate, 𝑟!", 
and the appropriate forward rate, 𝑓!",!"!!": 
 (1+ 𝑟!")!" = 1+ 𝑟!" !" 1+ 𝑓!",!"!!" !"!!" (4.1) 
 
It is important to point out that 𝐿𝑇 − 𝑆𝑇 > 0 as the long-term bonds have longer 
maturity than the short-term bills or securities. The standard practice in financial markets is to 
define short-term interest rate in terms of yields of bills and securities with maturities of one 
year or less and long-term interest rates as yields of bonds and securities with maturities of more 
than one year. Thus, it follows that the long-term rate can be expressed as a function of the 
short-term rate and an appropriate forward rate:  
 																																																								
6 The model that is presented in this section of the dissertation mostly follows Akram and Das’s (2014, 2015, 
2017a, 2017b, 2018) and Akram and Li’s (2017a, 2017b, 2018) interpretation of Keynes’s conjectures.  
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𝑟!" = 𝐹! 𝑟!" , 𝑓!",!"!!"  (4.2) 
  
The forward rate, 𝑓!",!"!!", is a function of the future short-term interest rate, 𝑟!, and the 
term premium, 𝑧:  
 𝑓!",!"!!" = 𝐹! 𝑟! , 𝑧  (4.3) 
 
But the future short-term interest rate and the term premium are contingent on the 
expected inflation rate and the expected growth rate. Hence, it is really investor’s views of the 
future as regards to future short-term rates and term premium that determine the forward rate. 
We have seen that the central banks in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico all adjust their policy rate 
in response to inflation and its expectations. This is the standard conventional view that by 
steering the interest rate the central bank can control the rate of inflation and the rate of 
economic activity. The mechanism at work here is that once the inflation and/or growth are high 
(low) then the central bank steps in and increases (decreases) the policy rate. When the central 
bank induces change in the short-term interest rate, it affects the entire interest rate curve. Since 
short-term interest rate follow the central bank’s policy rate, the investor’s views of future short-
term rates and term premium are jointly determined by the investor’s expectations about the 
future behavior of inflation, 𝜋!, and economic activity, 𝑔! (Akram and Das 2014). Along these 
lines, we can write that: 
 𝐹! 𝑟! , 𝑧 = 𝐹! 𝜋! ,𝑔!       (4.4) 
 
Keynes’s Notion Of Uncertainty 
This is where our modeling starts to follow Keynes’s methodology. Keynes’s liquidity 
preference is tied with the concept of fundamental uncertainty, which is very different from 
calculated probabilistic risk (Davidson 1994, 86-104; Lavoie 2006, 17; Kregel 1998, 113-8). 
Since the future is unknown and unpredictable, it is impossible to know the probability of an 
event occurring. The notion of ontological uncertainty is present in Keynes, especially when he 
writes that: 
 
“The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of 
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knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made. 
Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an investment 
some years hence is usually very slight and often negligible. If we speak 
frankly, we have to admit that our basis of knowledge for estimating the 
yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile factory, the 
goodwill of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of 
London amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years 
hence.” (Keynes [1936] 2007, 149). 
 
Keynes compared financial markets to beauty contests in order to point out how mass 
psychology, social norms, and tactic conventions can play a role in forcing the public, instead of 
trying to select the personally prettiest face, to try and choose what everyone else in the public 
selects as the prettiest (Keynes [1936] 2007, 156). This issue had also been tackled by Simon 
(1957), who argued that “the consequences an individual thinks will follow on his actions 
depend on what actions he thinks other individuals will take (72). By exploring the concept of 
bounded rationality, Simon (1957, 1978, 1984) ended up being very much against the theory of 
rational choice that simply ignores the limits of economic agents as mechanisms for 
computation and choice since the capacity of the human mind is very restricted. Foley (1998) is 
a more current study on bounded rationality that states that computational complexity 
constitutes a barrier to rationality in a nonlinear dynamical system. But even before Simon, 
there was Arrow (1951, 1986) who pointed out that the notions of risk-neutrality, static time, 
and completeness of information, are underlying necessitates, far away from reality, that make 
economic units rational. Thus, Keynes’s claim on the formation of investor’s expectations is at 
odds with rational actors and their calculated mathematical expectations. 
Fundamental uncertainty is linked to historical time and bounded rationality. The future 
is different from the past and “if nothing very definite is looming up in the future to provide a 
fulcrum on which expectations can rest, the present will exert strong influence on the operative 
expectations (Kahn 1972, 92). Kregel has extended this line of analysis suggesting that investors 
fall back on common sense based on current, actual observation of the markets, rather than on 
formulation of probability by assessing uncertain information (Kregel 1998, 117). Ultimately, it 
was Keynes himself, who argued that short-term realizations drive the investor’s long-term 
expectations. Namely, investors seem to be “oversensitive…to the near future, about which we 
may think that we know a little” since “in truth, we know almost nothing about the more remote 
future.” (Keynes 1930, 359-62, cited in Kregel 2011, 4). What happens is that investors just tend 
to rely on “the existing situation and project it into the future”. (Keynes, [1936] 2007, 148). 
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Hence, investor’s view of the future long-term outlook becomes simply an extrapolation of 
current economic conditions. Clark and Davig (2018) and Faust and Wright (2013) are 
empirically behavioral studies of the investor’s expectations of interest rates that concur with 
Keynes’s views. 
Following Keynes’s views that short-term realizations drive investor’s long term 
expectations as the investor extrapolates the future outlook from the present, current rate of 
inflation, 𝜋, and current rate of economic, 𝑔, activity influence investor’s expectations of 
inflation and economic activity. Thus, we can simply write, 𝜋! = 𝐹!(𝜋) and 𝑔! = 𝐹!(𝑔). From 
here it follows that:  
 𝑓!",!"!!" = 𝐹! 𝑟! , 𝑧 = 𝐹! 𝜋! ,𝑔! = 𝐹! 𝐹! 𝜋 ,𝐹! 𝑔   (4.5) 
 
The equation above simply states that the forward rate is a function of the current 
inflation rate and the current growth rate based on Keynes’s conjectures that near-term views 
predominantly affect investors’ long-term outlook. Therefore, the long-term interest rate, 𝑟!", is 
a function of short-term interest rate, 𝑟!", current inflation rate, 𝜋, and current growth rate, 𝑔, 
and this can be expressed in the following way: 
 𝑟!" = 𝐹! 𝑟!" ,𝐹! 𝐹! 𝜋 ,𝐹! 𝑔 = 𝐹! 𝑟!" ,𝜋,𝑔  (4.6) 
 
Lastly, testing for crowding out implies that we need to take into consideration the 
government deficit (or debt)-to-GDP ratios. This ultimately tests the mainstream crowding out 
argument that higher government deficit and debt ratios increase the long-term government 
bond yields. The government finance variable could affect the long-term rates by influencing 
the forward rate. Consequently, we can easily incorporate the government finance variable – 
making the long-term interest rate to be a function of the short-term interest rate, the inflation 
rate, the growth rate, and the government finance variable, 𝑉. That is,  
 𝑟!" = 𝐹! 𝑟!" ,𝜋,𝑔,𝑉  (4.7) 
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Data 
Time-series monthly data on short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates, and 
inflation rates are used for the econometric models that we evaluate in the following chapter. 
Short-term interest rate data cover the official interest rate (i.e., reference rate) targets set by 
each individual central bank. The _P notation after some of the _STIR variables denotes a proxy 
variable. Figure 20 illustrates that the proxy variables tend to follow closely the central banks’ 
policy (reference) rates. We need to be cautious with regards to Brazil, as there seems to be a 
discrepancy between BR_STIR and BR_STIR_P. The Selic target rate is the official policy rate 
set by the Brazilian central bank. The IRB Interbank overnight rate indicates Colombia’s 
monetary market liquidity where the Colombian central bank is the manager of the IBR index. 
Similarly, the central bank of Mexico conducts the operational overnight target interest rate. 
With respect to the proxy short-term interest rates we use the IMF (for Brazil) and the OECD 
(for Colombia and Mexico) average estimates of rates at which short-term government paper is 
issued or traded in the market. These rates are based on the three-month money market rate and 
the Treasury bill rate. 
The long-term interest rate data include yields from long-term sovereign domestic 
currency denominated government bonds of a 3-year (for Brazil), 5-year (for Colombia and 
Mexico), and 10-year maturities (for all three countries). These interest rates are also implied by 
the prices at which these securities are traded on the financial markets and the value that is taken 
is the last monthly bid price.7 All these securities are denominated in their respective domestic 
currency. The government sector is the issuer of all these securities with the obligor being the 
Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Colombia, and the United Mexican States, 
respectively. These bonds are a fixed type – meaning that each individual government upon 
issuance of the securities fixes the interest rate paid. The modality of the bonds is nominal and 
non-negotiable with redemption taking place at nominal value on maturity date. All of the bonds 
that we are using are fixed-rate securities whose par value is the nominal value of the security 
on the issuance date of the auctions.  
The consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of prices paid by consumers for a market 
basket of consumer goods and services. This is sometimes referred to as the core inflation, 
																																																								
7 Interpolation technique is used to populate very few missing data observations of the long-term interest rate. 
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which excludes food and energy items, measured as the percentage change year-over-year. 
These yearly growth rates represent the inflation rate. 
 
Figure 20. Central Bank Policy Rates and Proxy Short-Term Interest Rates by Country 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal; IMF International Financial Statistics; OECD Main Economic Indicators, Finance. 
Note: For more detailed description of the data and the notations please refer to Table 3. 
 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the standard measure of the value of final goods and 
services produced by a country in a given period of time. Data are internationally comparable 
following the System of National Accounts. This indicator is seasonally adjusted and is 
measured as the percentage change year-over-year. Industrial production is often referred to as a 
proxy for the GDP as it indicates the output of industrial operation and activity within sectors 
such as mining, manufacturing, and electricity. This is a seasonally adjusted indicator expressed 
in an index, also measured as a percentage change year-over-year.  
Government finance data covers gross and net government debt, and overall net and 
primary net lending/borrowing, all measured as a percentage of nominal GDP. Gross 
government debt and net government debt-to-GDP ratios are stock variables and represent the 
general government financial liabilities. The difference between the two is that net debt 
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comprises all financial liabilities minus all financial assets of the general government. Some of 
these financial assets include currency and deposits, securities, loans, and other accounts 
receivable. The overall net lending/borrowing, and the primary net lending/borrowing-to-GDP 
ratios, are flow variables and represent the overall and the primary government balance, 
respectively. The overall balance is the more common fiscal balance measure and it simply 
measures the difference between revenues and grants, and expenditures and net lending. The 
primary budget balance is just the overall balance but excluding interest payments from 
expenditures. Positive balance indicates overall/primary surplus, while a negative balances 
indicates overall/primary deficit. There is an ongoing discussion on what is the better measure 
as the interest rates are assigned based on the size of the previous government deficits. For this 
reason, in the following chapter we include all of the government finance variables in our 
econometric analysis. 
Table 3 below provides a summary of the data and the variables used in the econometric 
models. The first column lists the variable names; the second column provides the description 
and the date range of the data; the third column indicates the frequency and points out if it has 
also been converted to a different frequency; the final column shows the primary and the 
secondary sources. 
 
Table 3. Summary of the Data and the Variables 
Variables Data Description and Date Range Frequency Source(s) 
Short-Term Interest Rates 
BR_STIR 
Brazil, Selic Target Rate, 
% 
2000M1-2019M1 
Daily; converted to 
monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
BR_STIR_P 
Brazil, Money Market 
Rate (or 3-Month Treasury 
Bill Rate), % 
2004M1-2019M1 
Monthly IMF International Financial Statistics 
COL_STIR 
Colombia, IBR Overnight 
Nominal Interbank 
Reference Rate, % 
2008M1-2018M12 
Daily; converted to 
monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
COL_STIR_P 
Colombia, Money Market 
Rate (or 3-Month Treasury 
Bill Rate), % 
2000M1-2019M1 
Monthly OECD Main Economic Indicators: Finance 
MEX_STIR 
Mexico, Overnight Target 
Interest Rate, % 
2007M1-2019M1 
Daily; converted to 
monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
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Variables Data Description and Date Range Frequency Source(s) 
MEX_STIR_P 
Mexico, Money Market 
Rate (or 3-Month Treasury 
Bill Rate), % 
2000M1-2019M1 
Monthly OECD Main Economic Indicators: Finance 
Long-Term Interest Rates 
BR_GB3YR 
Brazil, Generic 
Government Bond, 3 Year, 
Yield, % 
2010M6-2018M12 
Monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
BR_GB10YR 
Brazil, Generic 
Government Bond, 10 
Year, Yield, % 
2007M3-2019M1 
Monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
COL_GB5YR 
Colombia, Generic 
Government Bond, 5 Year, 
Yield, % 
2001M8-2019M1 
Monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
COL_GB10YR 
Colombia, Generic 
Government Bond, 10 
Year, Yield, % 
2003M1-2018M12 
Monthly OECD Main Economic Indicators: Finance 
MEX_GB5YR 
Mexico, Generic 
Government Bond, 5 Year, 
Yield, % 
2011M3-2019M1 
Monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
MEX_GB10YR 
Mexico, Generic 
Government Bond, 10 
Year, Yield, % 
2001M7-2019M1 
Monthly OECD Main Economic Indicators: Finance 
Inflation 
BR_INF 
Brazil, Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), Total, Index, 
% Change, Y/Y 
2000M1-2019M1 
Monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
COL_INF 
Colombia, CPI, Total, 
Index, % Change, Y/Y 
Bloomberg Terminal 
2000M1-2019M1 
Monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
MEX_INF 
Mexico, CPI, Total, Index, 
% Change, Y/Y 
2000M1-2019M1 
Monthly Bloomberg Terminal 
Economic Activity 
BR_GDP 
Brazil, GDP, Total, 
Constant Prices, 
Seasonally Adjusted (SA), 
Chained, % Change, Y/Y 
2000Q1-2018Q4 
Quarterly 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators: National 
Accounts Statistics 
BR_IP 
Brazil, Industrial 
Production Index, SA, % 
Change, Y/Y 
2000Q1-2018Q2 
Quarterly 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators: Production 
and Sales 
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Variables Data Description and Date Range Frequency Source(s) 
COL_GDP 
Colombia, GDP, Total, 
Constant Prices, 
Seasonally Adjusted (SA), 
Chained, % Change, Y/Y 
2006Q1-2018Q3 
Quarterly 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators: National 
Accounts Statistics 
COL_IP 
Colombia, Industrial 
Production Index, SA, % 
Change, Y/Y 
2000Q1-2018Q2 
Quarterly 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators: Production 
and Sales 
MEX_GDP 
Mexico, GDP, Total, 
Constant Prices, 
Seasonally Adjusted (SA), 
Chained, % Change, Y/Y 
2000Q1-2018Q4 
Quarterly 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators: National 
Accounts Statistics 
MEX_IP 
Mexico, Industrial 
Production Index, SA, % 
Change, Y/Y 
2000Q1-2017Q4 
Quarterly 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators: Production 
and Sales 
Government Finance 
BR_GROSS 
Brazil, Gross Government 
Debt, % of Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
BR_NET 
Brazil, Net Government 
Debt, % of Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
BR_OVERALL 
Brazil, Net 
Lending/Borrowing 
(Overall Balance), % of 
Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
BR_PRIMARY 
Brazil, Primary Net 
Lending/Borrowing 
(Primary Balance), % of 
Nominal GDP 
2002-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
COL_GROSS 
Colombia, Gross 
Government Debt, % of 
Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
COL_NET 
Colombia, Net 
Government Debt, % of 
Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
COL_OVERALL 
Colombia, Net 
Lending/Borrowing 
(Overall Balance), % of 
Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
COL_PRIMARY 
Colombia, Primary Net 
Lending/Borrowing 
(Primary Balance), % of 
Nominal GDP 
2002-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
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Variables Data Description and Date Range Frequency Source(s) 
MEX_GROSS 
Mexico, Gross 
Government Debt, % of 
Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
MEX_NET 
Mexico, Net Government 
Debt, % of Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
MEX_OVERALL 
Mexico, Net 
Lending/Borrowing 
(Overall Balance), % of 
Nominal GDP 
2000-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
MEX_PRIMARY 
Mexico, Primary Net 
Lending/Borrowing 
(Primary Balance), % of 
Nominal GDP 
2002-2018 
Yearly IMF Fiscal Monitor 
 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH, FINDINGS, AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
Model Specification And Estimation 
Macroeconomic time-series studies are typically categorized as either stationary or non-
stationary models. For stationary data, one can proceed with an econometric model using the 
classical, standard method of estimation. However, our variables are non-stationary, meaning 
that there is more than one trend in the series.8 Due to the nature of our variables, it is 
imperative that we conduct econometric analysis under a non-stationary cointegration 
framework in order to study the long-run relationship of the determinants of long-term interest 
rates for Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. For this reason, the Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
model, as developed by Johansen (1998, 1991, 1995), is applied to examine the dynamic 
relation among the long-term interest rates (𝑟!"), the short-term interest rates (𝑟!"), the inflation 
rate (𝜋), GDP growth rate (𝑔), and the government finance variables (𝑉). If the series are 
cointegrated9, then they are trending together in the long run. Using Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) model in first differences would not be able to capture the long-run tendencies since 
Johansen’s VEC framework restricts the long-run behavior of the endogenous variable from 
converging to their cointegrating relations, while allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics 																																																								
8 It will be shown later that the variables in the model are non-stationary. 
9 It will be shown later that the variables of interest are cointegrated.	
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(Akram and Li 2017b, 2018). Basically, a VAR framework can be extended to the VEC model, 
which is adapted to the first differences of the non-stationary variables with a lagged error 
correction terms among the series.  
Any VAR model can be adapted and re-written as a VEC model (Engle and Granger 
1987). Thus, we can express the VEC framework as: 
 
∆𝑦! = 𝑣 + Π𝑦!!! + Γ∆𝑦!!! + 𝜖!!!!!!!  
 
(5.1) 
In this equation, Π = Α!!!!!!! − Ι! and Γ! = − Α!!!!!!!!! . Based on our Keynesian 
framework, we would be dealing with two models, namely, 𝑦! = (𝑟!" , 𝑟!" ,𝜋,𝑔) (Model 1), or 𝑦! = (𝑟!" , 𝑟!" ,𝜋,𝑔,𝑉) (Model 2). In this specification, Γ!∆𝑦!!! is the vector autoregressive 
component in the first difference and Π𝑦!!! is the error-correction component; 𝑣 is a 
determininstic shift vector with an (𝑛 × 1) vector of constants; 𝜖! is the residual of the model 
with an (𝑛 × 1) vector of white noise error terms; Γ! is an (𝑛 × 𝑛) matrix that stands for the 
short-run adjustment coefficients between the variables with (𝑝 − 1) number of lags and Π is an (𝑛 × 𝑛) matrix of parameters. Π = 𝛼𝛽′, where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are (𝑛 × 𝑛) matrices of rank 𝑟, where 𝑟 
is the number of linearly independent cointegrating vectors; 𝛼 then explains the long-run 
disequilibrium by representing the speed of adjustment coefficient of the error correction 
mechanism, whereas 𝛽 stands fro the matrix of cointegrating vectors that explains the long-run 
relations (StataCorp 2013). Within this model specification, the 𝑦! process is non-stationary, 
while both the first-differenced process ∆𝑦! and the linear combinations 𝛽′𝑦!!! are stationary.  
The model estimation process consists of four steps. First, we test for a unit root in each 
series and its first difference. Second, given that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
series have a unit root, we test whether the variables in our model are cointegrated or not, and, if 
so, we detect the number of cointegrating vectors in the system. Third, we perform diagnostic 
tests on our multivariate VEC estimation models by conducting an analysis on the significance 
of the short-run error-correction terms (ECT), as well as comment on serial correlation, 
normality, and stability. Fourth, we interpret the results from a Keynesian perspective. 
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Stationarity Testing 
The first step in estimating the VEC model is to conduct unit root tests. The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is one of the most common tests used in examining stationarity and 
the level of integration of the variables (Dickey and Fuller 1979, 1981). The tests are conducted 
in levels and first differences. Table 4 reports the ADF unit root results of the variables used in 
our empirical analysis. The null hypothesis is that the variable has a unit root. If the p-value is 
below the 5% significance level, we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
Based on the results reported, most of the variables indicate a presence of a unit root, 
even when using a trend, and trend and lags. From the short-term interest rates, COL_STIR, 
COL_STIR_P, and MEX_STIR_P are the only variables that show no signs of unit root when 
conducted with trend and lags. All of the long-term interest rate and inflation rate variables have 
a unit root. The same holds true for all of the four government finance variables for all three 
countries, except perharps for BR_PRIMARY (with a trend, and with a trend and lag), which 
comes close to the 5% level of significance of rejecting the unit root presence. For economic 
activity, the p-values for BR_GDP and COL_GDP indicate a stronger evidence for the presence 
of a unit root compared to BR_IP and COL_IP. However, this does not hold true for Mexico 
since MEX_IP is the variable with p-values that are closer to the acceptable region of the unit 
root. Thus, for Mexico, we use industrial production as a proxy for GDP growth. Figure 3A 
from the appendix shows the strong correlation between the year-over-year growth of industrial 
production and the year-over-year growth of real GDP for Mexico. Since industrial production 
captures the change and fluctuation of the business conditions, we can use MEX_IP as a proxy 
indicator of economic activity. 
One way to deal with a unit root (stochastic trend) is by taking the first difference of the 
variables (i.e., ∆). When we take the first difference of the variables, the null hypothesis of a 
unit root becomes rejected. The only exceptions to this are ∆COL_STIR, ∆MEX_STIR, and ∆BR_GB3YR, but only with trend and lags. Hence, we can conclude that all of the variables in 
our model are integrated of the first order, I(1), series. This means that our variables are non-
stationary in levels, but stationary in first differences.  
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Table 4. Results From Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests  
Variables Without a Trend With a Trend With Trend and Lags 
Short-Term Interest Rates 
BR_STIR 0.8481 0.8733 0.2951 ∆BR_STIR 0.000 0.000 0.001 
BR_STIR_P 0.6028 0.606 0.3409 ∆BR_STIR_P 0.000 0.000 0.028 
COL_STIR 0.2248 0.6571 0.0011 ∆COL_STIR 0.000 0.000 0.2229 
COL_STIR_P 0.2475 0.8096 0.0189 ∆COL_STIR_P 0.000 0.000 0.03 
MEX_STIR 0.9611 0.997 0.9637 ∆MEX_STIR 0.000 0.000 0.1638 
MEX_STIR_P 0.1751 0.4891 0.0159 ∆MEX_STIR_P 0.000 0.000 0.0008 
Long-Term Interest Rates 
BR_GB3YR 0.7024 0.8977 0.4904 ∆BR_GB3YR 0.000 0.000 0.3615 
BR_GB10YR 0.4666 0.6876 0.3127 ∆BR_GB10YR 0.000 0.000 0.0441 
COL_GB5YR 0.3653 0.3467 0.2833 ∆COL_GB5YR 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COL_GB10YR 0.1743 0.2734 0.3238 ∆COL_GB10YR 0.000 0.000 0.0049 
MEX_GB5YR 0.8488 0.0839 0.8102 ∆MEX_GB5YR 0.000 0.000 0.0159 
MEX_GB10YR 0.1324 0.4654 0.9892 ∆MEX_GB10YR 0.000 0.000 0.0001 
Inflation 
BR_INF 0.6663 0.8241 0.7158 ∆BR_INF 0.000 0.000 0.0013 
COL_INF 0.5376 0.8246 0.5914 ∆COL_INF 0.000 0.000 0.0042 
MEX_INF 0.0877 0.3204 0.9022 ∆MEX_INF 0.000 0.000 0.0049 
Economic Activity 
BR_GDP 0.1387 0.2596 0.0125 ∆BR_GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BR_IP 0.0679 0.1643 0.0002 ∆BR_IP 0.000 0.000 0.0004 
COL_GDP 0.2712 0.4179 0.3407 ∆COL_GDP 0.000 0.000 0.0001 
COL_IP 0.0736 0.238 0.1333 ∆COL_IP 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MEX_GDP 0.0657 0.2057 0.0003 ∆MEX_GDP 0.000 0.000 0.0004 
MEX_IP 0.143 0.385 0.0073 ∆MEX_IP 0.000 0.000 0.0005 
Government Finance 
BR_GROSS 0.9541 0.9866 0.9875 ∆BR_GROSS 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BR_NET 0.8274 0.99 0.9904 ∆BR_NET 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BR_OVERALL 0.7815 0.7535 0.7543 
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Variables	 Without a Trend With a Trend With Trend and Lags ∆BR_OVERALL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BR_PRIMARY 0.2051 0.0681 0.0562 ∆BR_PRIMARY 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COL_GROSS 0.9177 0.7942 0.9188 ∆COL_GROSS 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COL_NET 0.7439 0.8461 0.8472 ∆COL_NET 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COL_OVERALL 0.2426 0.5249 0.5164 ∆COL_OVERALL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
COL_PRIMARY 0.2353 0.3423 0.3306 ∆COL_PRIMARY 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MEX_GROSS 0.9091 0.6982 0.7017 ∆MEX_GROSS 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MEX_NET 0.9212 0.7642 0.7664 ∆MEX_NET 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MEX_OVERALL 0.2663 0.518 0.5093 ∆MEX_OVERALL 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MEX_PRIMARY 0.2166 0.5045 0.4948 ∆MEX_PRIMARY 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: ADF test (𝐻!: series has a unit root). We use 12 lags for the monthly data, 4 lags for the quarterly data, and 
1 lag the yearly data series. The symbol ∆ denotes first difference. 
 
Cointegration Testing 
For the cointegration analysis we implement a cointegration method developed by 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) in order to examine the possible long-run 
relationship between the long-term interest rate, the short-term interest rate, the inflation rate, 
the rate of economic activity, and the government finance ratios. The first step of the Johansen 
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration method involves determining the optimal 
number of lag length and the common procedure for this is performing a VAR model with the 
variables in levels. To analyze the cointegration relationship between the variables, we run ten 
VAR models for each of the three countries. Results using VAR are generally sensitive to the 
lag length criteria. Too many lags could increase the error in the forecast, whereas too few 
errors might miss out on a relevant causal relation. Consequently, before determining the 
number of the cointegrating relationship, lag lengths were chosen using four common criterion 
procedures, namely, the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), the Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC), the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), and the 
sequence of likelihood-ratio test statistic criterion. Due to the nature of the data we conduct lag 
criteria testing with a maximum of 12 lags.10  
																																																								
10 The results of the lag length criteria are not reported due to space constraints, but are available upon request. 
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The second step is generating a trace statistic (or a maximum likelihood) estimation 
based on the data with linear time trends. The Johansen cointegraton test compares the trace 
statistics to their critical values. Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the trace tests’ statistics for 
determining whether the long-term interest rate is cointegrated with any of the variables, for 
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, respectively. Tables B1, B2, and B3 from the appendix reports 
the same set of results regarding the trace statistics, but the central banks’ policy (reference) rate 
is used for the short-term interest rate variable.  
The first row for each VAR model that we run has a row (𝑟 = 0), which tests the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. If the log likelihood of the unconstrained model that includes the 
cointegrating relations is significantly different from the log likelihood of the constrained model 
that does not include the cointegrating relations, we can reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration.  
The second row (𝑟 = 1) tests the null hypothesis of one cointegrating relation and so on. 
For instance, if we take the first VAR model we run for Brazil (BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR_P, 
BR_INF, BR_GDP), we can strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration because the 
computed value of the trace test statistic (47.7285) is greater than the critical value (47.21). In 
the next step, however, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relation 
since the trace statistic (19.0469) is less than the criticial value (29.68). Hence, we accept the 
null hypothesis that there is one cointegrating relation in the multivariate model. All of our VAR 
model in Tables 5, 6, and 7, as well as Tables B1, B2, and B3 from the appendix, demonstrate 
evidence of at least one cointegrating relation. This means that there is always at least one long-
run permanent component driving the entire system of our models for Brazil, Colombia, and 
Mexico. 
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Table 5. Brazil Multivariate Cointegration Trace Tests Using the 3-Month Rate 
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic 5% Critical Value 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP); Lag order=11 𝑟 = 0	 47.7285 47.21 𝑟 = 1 19.0469* 29.68 𝑟 = 2 7.6435 15.41 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 48.8189 47.21 𝑟 = 1 18.9534* 29.68 𝑟 = 2 6.2169 15.41 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_GROSS); Lag order=12 𝑟 = 0 134.4933 68.52 𝑟 = 1 47.9506 47.21 𝑟 = 2 25.2822* 29.68 𝑟 = 3 9.7612 15.41 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_NET); Lag order=12 𝑟 = 0 117.0694 68.52 𝑟 = 1	 49.8540 47.21 𝑟 = 2 25.25492* 29.68 𝑟 = 3 13.4280 15.41 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_OVERALL); Lag order=12 𝑟 = 0 94.7548 68.52 𝑟 = 1 40.1536* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 20.1754 29.68 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_PRIMARY); Lag order=12 𝑟 = 0 122.9702 68.52 𝑟 = 1	 37.4213* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 16.3327 29.68 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_GROSS); Lag order=12 𝑟 = 0 248.4520 68.52 𝑟 = 1 114.7140 47.21 𝑟 = 2	 54.4332 29.68 𝑟 = 3 19.4103 15.41 𝑟 = 4 0.7069* 3.76 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_NET); Lag order=12 𝑟 = 0 256.2889 68.52 𝑟 = 1 107.3021 47.21 𝑟 = 2 56.229 29.68 𝑟 = 3 16.5522 15.41 𝑟 = 4 0.0595* 3.76 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_OVERALL); Lag order=12 𝑟 = 0 181.5997 68.52 𝑟 = 1 111.9028 47.21 𝑟 = 2 59.0106 29.68 𝑟 = 3 22.2352 15.41 𝑟 = 4 0.0795* 3.76 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR_P, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_PRIMARY); Lag order=12 𝑟 = 0 173.8239 68.52 𝑟 = 1 85.8244 47.21 𝑟 = 2 37.8426 29.68 𝑟 = 3 6.2222* 15.41 𝑟 = 4 0.1827 3.76 
Notes: 𝑟 denotes the number of cointegrated vectors. The symbol * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6. Colombia Multivariate Cointegration Trace Tests Using the 3-Month Rate  
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic 5% Critical Value 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP); Lag order=6 𝑟 = 0 79.0098 47.21 𝑟 = 1 32.1022 29.68 𝑟 = 2 8.8366* 15.41 𝑟 = 3 2.2560 3.76 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP); Lag order=5 𝑟 = 0 54.3529 47.21 𝑟 = 1 22.5667* 29.68 𝑟 = 2 9.012 15.41 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 71.9195 68.52 𝑟 = 1 42.3110* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 17.4481 29.68 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 72.0935 68.52 𝑟 = 1 43.0379* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 17.5020 29.68 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_OVERALL); Lag order=5 𝑟 = 0 77.9479 68.52 𝑟 = 1 41.4805* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 18.8970 29.68 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_PRIMARY); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 157.8659 68.52 𝑟 = 1 46.1254* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 23.4448 29.68 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 145.7566 68.52 𝑟 = 1 41.7911* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 16.3866 29.68 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 144.6347 68.52 𝑟 = 1 43.4298* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 17.8063 29.68 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_OVERALL); Lag order=5 𝑟 = 0 71.3426 68.52 𝑟 = 1 36.5564* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 17.5455 29.68 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR_P, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_PRIMARY); Lag order=5 𝑟 = 0 76.3654 68.52 𝑟 = 1 37.2603* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 19.0655 29.68 
Notes: 𝑟 denotes the number of cointegrated vectors. The symbol * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 7. Mexico Multivariate Cointegration Trace Tests Using the 3-Month Rate 
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic 5% Critical Value 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX_IP); Lag order=2 𝑟 = 0 53.4789 47.21 𝑟 = 1 30.4897 29.68 𝑟 = 2 14.8214* 15.41 𝑟 = 3 4.5878 3.76 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 76.1271 47.21 𝑟 = 1 19.4520* 29.68 𝑟 = 2 9.5094 15.41 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 76.6509 68.52 𝑟 = 1 42.9618* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 17.9091 29.68 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 75.3057 68.52 𝑟 = 1 41.7223* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 18.4237 29.68 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _OVERALL); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 86.9310 68.52 𝑟 = 1 46.9712* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 26.4831 29.68 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _PRIMARY); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 84.5639 68.52 𝑟 = 1 47.1436* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 27.0968 29.68 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 100.6117 68.52 𝑟 = 1 38.8986* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 15.3574 29.68 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX_NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 99.8084 68.52 𝑟 = 1 38.9193* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 14.3840 29.68 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _OVERALL); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 102.1040 68.52 𝑟 = 1 44.2139* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 18.918 29.68 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR_P, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _PRIMARY); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 102.3381 68.52 𝑟 = 1 43.8951* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 18.2857 29.68 
Notes: 𝑟 denotes the number of cointegrated vectors. The symbol * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
Diagnostics Testing 
Tables 8 and 9 (Brazil), 10 and 11 (Colombia), and 12 and 13 (Mexico) present the VEC 
model estimations using the 3-month rate. Similarly, Tables B4 and B5 (Brazil), B6 and B7 
(Colombia), and B8 and B9 (Mexico), from the appendix, demonstrate the VEC model 
estimations using the central banks’ policy rates. We basically specified two models earlier, 
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however, the second model includes four different measures for the government finance 
variable. Therefore, we estimate the following models: 
 
• 𝑦! = (Long-term interest rate, short-term interest rate, rate of inflation, rate of economic 
activity) (Model 1) 
• 𝑦! = (Long-term interest rate, short-term interest rate, rate of inflation, rate of economic 
activity, gross debt ratio) (Model 2a) 
• 𝑦! = (Long-term interest rate, short-term interest rate, rate of inflation, rate of economic 
activity, net debt ratio) (Model 2b) 
• 𝑦! = (Long-term interest rate, short-term interest rate, rate of inflation, rate of economic 
activity, overall balance ratio) (Model 2c) 
• 𝑦! = (Long-term interest rate, short-term interest rate, rate of inflation, rate of economic 
activity, primary balance ratio) (Model 2d) 
 
Before jumping into interpretation of the empirical findings we need first to comment on 
the diagnostic tests presented in the bottom panel of the tables. First, we conduct a Lagrange-
multiplier test for serial correlation in the residuals. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial 
correlation at a particular lag order. Most of our VEC model estimations do not indicate the 
presence of a serial correlation in the residuals. However, there are some that do exhibit serial 
correlation and we refit our models by increasing the number of lags since underspecifying the 
number of lags in a VEC model can significantly increase the finite-sample bias in the 
parameter estimates (Gonzalo 1994).11  
Second, the instrumental assumption behind deriving a likelihood function is that errors 
of the series are independently, identically, and normally distributed with zero mean and finite 
variance. When the errors are of this nature, then the parameter estimates are consistent and 
efficient. However, often times the errors are only independently and identically distributed, 
which makes the parameter estimates still consistent, but not efficient. For this reason we 
conduct a normality test by estimating skewness statistics. The null hypothesis is that the 
residual errors are normally distributed. For most of our VEC models we can reject the null 																																																								
11 In order to see in what models we have increased the number of lags, please refer to the first two rows from the 
diagnostics section of Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, and B9. The values in the parentheses 
represent the new, increased number of observations and lags used in the models. 
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hypothesis, which means that the errors seem to be skewed. Model (1) from Table 8, model (2b) 
from Table 9, models (1) and (2c) from Table 10, model (1) from Table B4, model (2d) from 
Table B8, and model (1) from Table B9, are the only models that exhibit normality of the errors. 
However, we have to note that we deal with estimations that have monthly, quarterly, and yearly 
data in them. Hence, our model’s goodness of fit will never be ideal since we are regressing 
yearly and quarterly data on a monthly data basis.12  
Next, we evaluate the stability of the estimated VEC models, which essentially means 
checking whether we have correctly specified the number of cointegrating equations. In a K-
variable model with r cointgrating equations (i.e., relations) the matrix of the VEC model has (𝐾 − 𝑟) unit eigenvalues. For the model to be stable, the moduli of the remaining 𝑟 eigenvalues 
should be less than one, and this holds true for all of our VEC estimated models (StataCorp 
2013). 
Lastly, one critical component of the VEC models is the error correction term (ECT) 
presented in the middle panel of the tables. The term itself represents the dependent variable’s 
speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium after a change in the independent variables in 
the model. The lagged ECT should be negative and significant. This provides evidence of an 
existing long-run relationship between the independent and the dependent variables because the 
significantly negative feedback is necessary for the independent variable to revert back to the 
existing, stable long-run equilibrium. ECTs for all equations are shown in the middle panel of 
the tables, but our only interest is in the first row; that a stable cointegration relation enters 
significantly in the long-term interest rate equation. All VEC model equations that have a 
negative and significant ECT for the lagged long-term interest rate are highlighted in light green 
in the tables for the Johanesen VEC model estimations.  
 
Interpretation Of Results 
We normalize all of the VEC models with respect to the coefficient of the long-term 
interest rate. The process of normalization reverses the signs in the tables for the VEC model 
estimations. Since we are interested in analyzing the drivers of the long-term interest rates, we 
select the models that contain the longer maturity government bonds (i.e., the 10-year bonds). 																																																								
12 By conducting the skewness statistic to test the null hypothesis that the residual errors are normally distributed, it 
is exactly the government finance variables that generate the highest chi-squared statistic in the VEC equation, 
which basically make the results to indicate non-normality. Detailed results from the skewness statistics tests are 
available upon request.	
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We take model (2b) from Table 8, model (2c) from Table 10, and model (2a) from Table B8, for 
Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, respectively, as base-line examples and state the cointegrating 
vector relationships: 
 𝐵𝑅_𝐺𝐵10𝑌𝑅 = −11.85 + 0.712 𝑩𝑹_𝑺𝑻𝑰𝑹_𝑷 − 0.557 𝑩𝑹_𝑰𝑵𝑭− 0.009 𝐵𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃 – 0.117 𝑩𝑹_𝑵𝑬𝑻 (5.1) 
 𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐺𝐵10𝑌𝑅 = 1.279 + 0.946 𝑪𝑶𝑳_𝑺𝑻𝑰𝑹_𝑷 + 0.262 𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐹+ 0.577 𝑪𝑶𝑳_𝑮𝑫𝑷 – 0.36 𝐶𝑂𝐿_𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐿 (5.2) 
 𝑀𝐸𝑋_𝐺B10𝑌𝑅 == 7.746 + 1.689 𝑴𝑬𝑿_𝑺𝑻𝑰𝑹 − 1.113 𝑴𝑬𝑿_𝑰𝑵𝑭 + 0.287 𝑴𝑬𝑿_𝑰𝑷 + 0.218 𝑴𝑬𝑿_𝑵𝑬𝑻 (5.3) 
 
These models have the highest-magnitude, negative, and significant error correction 
terms for the lagged long-term interest rate. The variables in bold in the three equations 
represent the significant variables in the cointegrating relation. For Mexico we use the central 
bank’s policy rate because none of the VEC model estimations, with the 3-month Treasury bill 
rate, have negative and significant error-correction terms. The cointgrating equation (5.2) for 
Colombia is also the only one of the three that exhibits normality in the residual errors. 
The results of the equations indicate that there is a significant long-run relationship 
between the short-term interest rate and the long-term interest rate. A 1 percentage point 
increase in the 3-month Treasury bill rate causes a 71.2 basis point rise in the Brazilian long-
term interest rates. For Colombia and Mexico, the size of the coefficients for the short-term 
interest rates is even higher – namely, a 1 percentage point increase in the 3-month Treasury bill 
rate (or central bank’s policy rate for Mexico) leads to 94.6 and 168.9 basis points rise in the 
Colombian and Mexican long-term interest rates, respectively. These results align with the 
Keynesian view that short-term interest rates are the key drivers of long-term interest rates. 
Besides in these models, short-term interest rates are the main drivers of long-term interest rates 
for models (1), (2b), (2c), (2d) from Table 8; for models (2b) and (2d) from Table 9; for model 
(1) from Table B4; for models (1) and (2c) from Table B5; for models (1), (2c), and (2d) from 
Table 10; for models (1), (2c), and (2d) from Table 11; for models (1), (2b), (2c), and (2d) from 
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Table B6; and for models (1), (2a), and (2b) from Table B9. The magnitude of the coefficients 
of the short-term interests from the appendix tables parallels with the magnitude when using the 
3-month rate, thus, reinforcing our findings. Furthermore, in some cases (e.g., Colombia 10-year 
bond) the central bank’s policy rate seem to be, by far, in terms of size of the coefficient, the 
most important long-run determinant of the yields.  
Over the long run, the inflation rate is significantly and negatively related to the 
Brazilian and Mexican government bond yields (see equations 5.1 and 5.3). In equation (5.2), 
the coefficient for the rate of inflation for Colombia is positive, but insignificant. However, for 
Brazil, Tables 8 and 9 indicate an unclear effect of the inflation rate on the long-term interest 
rates. In some cases it is positive, in some it is negative, and in some instances it is insignificant. 
For Colombia, we encounter similarities - the inflation has a positive, but weak, relation to the 
10-year bond yield (see Table 10), and positive and significant association with the 5-year bond 
yield for model (1) from Table 11 and for models (2c) and (2d) from Table B7. Table B9 also 
demonstrates evidence of some positive impact of the inflation rate on the 5-year Mexican 
government bond yield. These results align with the view that inflation and inflation 
expectations exert an upward pressure on the government bond yields as investors seek to be 
compensated for holding bonds with longer maturities.  
Nevertheless, Tables B4 and B5 for Brazil, Table B6 for Colombia, and Table B8 for 
Mexico, show that a rise in inflation leads to a fall in the long-term interest rates. This is 
contrary to the conventional view that higher inflation and higher inflationary expectations exert 
an upward pressure on the government bond yields. In some of these models, the inflation rate is 
the most influential driver of the long-term interest rates. One possible explanation for this could 
be that Banco Central do Brasil, Banco de la Republica, and Banco de Mexico, increase (lower) 
their benchmark policy rates in the face of upward (downward) inflationary pressures or in 
anticipation of higher (lower) inflationary expectations. This means that the short-term interest 
rates tend be collinear with inflation, so the coefficient of the inflation rate does not necessarily 
mean that it would have the expected sign (Akram and Das 2017b). Another plausible 
explanation would be that when inflation increases, a commodity price boom follows, which 
improves the current account balance, furthermore improving the country’s credit rating. Since 
investment grade bonds tend to have lower yields, it follows that higher inflation rates can lead 
to lower government bond yields.  
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The results from equations (5.2) and (5.3) indicate a positive relationship between the 
rates of economic activity and the long-term interest rates for Colombia and Mexico, 
respectively, whereas the results from equation (5.1) show negative but insignificant 
relationships between the rates of economic activity and the long-term interest rates for Brazil. 
The models in Tables 8 (except for models (1) and (2b)) and 9 indicate positive and significant 
impact on the Brazilian government bond yields. The pace of economic activity also tends to 
increase the long-term interest rates on the Colombian (see Tables 10, 11, and B7) and Mexican 
(see Table B8) government bonds. There are three channels through which the pace of economic 
activity positively impacts the government bond yields. The first channel could be through the 
short-term interest rates because the central banks would try to slow down the economy by 
increasing their policy rates. Second, it could be that inflation increases following a higher 
economic activity so the transitory mechanism works through the inflation rate. Or, third, it 
could simply be that investors are prone to higher risk taking as the economic activity improves 
(Akram and Li 2017a). However, in Tables B4 and B5, the rate of economic activity seems to 
exert downward pressure on the Brazilian government bond yields. One reason behind this 
could be that favorable economic conditions improve the credit rating of the Brazilian public 
debt, thus leading to lower yields. 
The most interesting result from equation (5.1) is that an increase in government finance 
impacts negatively the long-term interest rates. That is, an increase in the government net debt-
to-GDP ratio by 1 percentage point leads to a 11.7 basis points decline in the government bond 
yields. We observe similar results for model (2b) from Table 9 and for models (2a) and (2b) 
from Table B4, that is, that higher government indebtedness reduces the long-term interest rate 
on the Brazilian government bonds. Furthermore, models (2c) and (2d) from Tables B4 and B5, 
show that an improvement in the overall and primary fiscal balance ratios actually leads to an 
increase in the government bond yields. This also goes against the conventional view that an 
increase in the fiscal balance ratios crowds out available funds for the private sector’s 
borrowing/lending in the loanable funds market.  
An explanation to these findings is that the act of government spending actually 
increases the amount of banks deposits/reserves in the system by the same amount. The 
Treasury department of Brazil coordinates operations with the central bank, so that, when the 
Treasury spends, it pays from its account at the central bank. Treasury spending is a 
simultaneous credit to the bank deposits and the banking system’s reserves at the central bank. 
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As the banking system’s deposits and/or reserves rise, banks offer to lend reserves in the 
overnight market and eventually lend at even lower interest rates. This exerts downward 
pressure on the policy rate, and with that, on the short-term interest rates. Banks are now willing 
to own long-duration securities with higher yields over short-term securities with lower yields. 
However, as banks have more incentive to hold long-term securities, this causes downward 
pressure on the long-term interest rates (Akram and Das 2017a, 28; Akram and Li 2017b, 32-3; 
2018, 388; Wray 2003, 74-96; 2012, 98-109).  
For Colombia and Mexico, on the other hand, the result with regards to the overall and 
the fiscal balance does not hold. In fact, in their case, a rise in the overall balance (i.e., 
improvement) lowers government bond yields. For Colombia, we can observe this in model (2d) 
from Table 10, and models (2c) and (2d) from Table 11. Similarly, models (2a) and (2b) from 
Table B8, as well as model (2b) from Table B9, show that in the long run higher gross and net 
debt ratios tend to increase the nominal yields of Mexican government bonds.  
One plausible explanation for these findings is that Colombia and Mexico have a 
relatively high share of non-residents (see Figures 14 and 15), so either a negative economic 
outlook and/or fears of debt defaulting can trigger a selling activity. This ultimately decreases 
the price of the bonds and leads to an increase in the long-term interest rates. Another reason 
could be that the governments of Colombia and Mexico are reliant on oil (and other 
commodities) revenues. Thus, when there is an improvement in the commodity prices 
government balances improve and investors buy more bonds. This pushes the price of bonds up 
and with that the long-term interest rates decline. 
Nevertheless, in model (2a) from Table 8 and model (2a) from Table 9, for Brazil; in 
model (2c) from Table 10, models (2b), (2c), and (2d) from Table B6, and models (2c) and (2d) 
from Table B7, for Colombia; all seem to demonstrate insignificant coefficients for the 
government finance variables. This is also a result since it gives an indication that the economic 
effect of the government finance variables is relatively weak in comparison to that of short-term 
interest rates, rate of inflation, and rate of economic activity. 
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Table 8. Brazil 10-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the 3-Month Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
BR_GB10YR 
BR_STIR_P -0.394*** -0.154 -0.712*** -0.511*** -0.590*** (0.138) (0.147) (0.119) (0.0758) (0.0502) 
BR_INF 0.453* -0.363 0.557** -0.192 -0.396*** (0.268) (0.333) (0.272) (0.169) (0.115) 
BR_GDP -0.00187 -0.720*** 0.00983 -0.269** -0.593*** (0.105) (0.220) (0.127) (0.127) (0.106) 
BR_GROSS  0.0564     (0.0347)    
BR_NET   0.117***     (0.0370)   
BR_OVERALL    0.0762     (0.0900)  
BR_PRIMARY     0.427***     (0.0976) 
Constant -10.47 -9.496 -11.85 -4.251 -2.013 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆BR_GB10YR(-1) -0.112** -0.161*** -0.336*** -0.344*** -0.436*** (0.0475) (0.0524) (0.0945) (0.0886) (0.128) ∆BR_STIR_P(-1) -0.117 -0.125 -0.199 -0.0397 -0.302 (0.0854) (0.0949) (0.178) (0.183) (0.247) ∆BR_INF(-1) -0.0760** -0.0871*** -0.0368 -0.0480 -0.00819 (0.0306) (0.0331) (0.0661) (0.0577) (0.0867) ∆BR_GDP(-1) 0.337*** 0.262*** 0.119 0.478*** 0.659*** (0.0986) (0.0903) (0.180) (0.177) (0.234) ∆BR_GROSS(-1)  0.0904     (0.127)    ∆BR_NET(-1)   0.0320     (0.257)   ∆BR_OVERALL(-1)    0.0370     (0.131)  ∆BR_PRIMARY(-1)     -0.0887     (0.102) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 131 130 (129) 130 (129) 130 (129) 130 (129) 
Lags 11 12 (13) 12 (13) 12 (13) 12 (13) 
Log Likelihood -333.509 -386.977 -380.455 -291.742 -222.596 
Serial Correlation 
Test 20.642 16.288 22.938 27.959 26.811 
P-value 0.193 0.906 0.906 0.31 0.365 
Skewness Test 7.622 157.656 157.656 193.384 120.797 
P-value 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.972 0.958 0.983 0.962 0.961 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
	 75 
Table 9. Brazil 3-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the 3-Month Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
BR_GB3YR 
BR_STIR_P -0.705*** -0.403*** -0.576*** -0.825*** -1.261*** (0.0985) (0.153) (0.0313) (0.196) (0.201) 
BR_INF -0.0769 -1.030*** -0.195*** 1.061*** 0.0448 (0.132) (0.379) (0.0740) (0.398) (0.429) 
BR_GDP 0.0276 -0.860*** -0.238*** 1.192*** -0.628** (0.0598) (0.171) (0.0336) (0.255) (0.258) 
BR_GROSS  0.00592     (0.0401)    
BR_NET   0.0206**     (0.00874)   
BR_OVERALL    -0.715***     (0.207)  
BR_PRIMARY     0.178     (0.298) 
Constant -3.295 1.397 -3.998 -14.71 2.996 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆BR_GB3YR(-1) -0.0145 -0.188*** -0.531* 0.135 -0.220* (0.0684) (0.0642) (0.307) (0.127) (0.115) ∆BR_STIR_P(-1) 0.387*** 0.0272 0.254 0.132 -0.138 (0.0905) (0.0958) (0.434) (0.184) (0.188) ∆BR_INF(-1) 0.129*** -0.0466 -0.0231 -0.000645 -0.0941 (0.0407) (0.0350) (0.165) (0.0613) (0.0620) ∆BR_GDP(-1) -0.171** 0.161** 0.691** -0.519*** 0.455*** (0.0778) (0.0731) (0.311) (0.101) (0.124) ∆BR_GROSS(-1)  0.768***     (0.190)    ∆BR_NET(-1)   4.551***     (0.460)   ∆BR_OVERALL(-1)    0.216     (0.176)  ∆BR_PRIMARY(-1)     -0.147*     (0.0846) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 102 91 91 91 91 
Lags 1 12 12 12 12 
Log Likelihood -337.167 -164.175 -151.579 -74.491 -35.438 
Serial Correlation 
Test 15.802 27.767 32.443 29.007 27.649 
P-value 0.467 0.319 0.146 0.264 0.324 
Skewness Test 36.959 22.93 10.317 82.543 52.472 
P-value 0.00 0.003 0.068 0.000 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.698 0.990 0.998 0.999 0.993 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 10. Colombia 10-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the 3-Month Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
COL_GB10YR 
COL_STIR_P -0.708*** -1.281** -1.500* -0.946*** -1.052*** (0.177) (0.602) (0.815) (0.221) (0.290) 
COL_INF -0.534*** 1.631*** 2.193*** -0.262 -0.291 (0.197) (0.580) (0.760) (0.230) (0.269) 
COL_GDP -0.541*** 2.559*** 3.253*** -0.577*** -0.622*** (0.119) (0.266) (0.346) (0.116) (0.143) 
COL_GROSS  0.385***     (0.112)    
COL_NET   0.466***     (0.155)   
COL_OVERALL    0.360     (0.219)  
COL_PRIMARY     0.673**     (0.301) 
Constant 0.238 -34.42 -37.45 1.279 1.195 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆COL_GB10YR(-1) -0.134*** 0.00970 0.00804 -0.155*** -0.127*** (0.0302) (0.00705) (0.00559) (0.0322) (0.0323) ∆COL_STIR_P(-1) -0.0113 0.0281*** 0.0221*** -0.00982 0.00146 (0.0127) (0.00266) (0.00212) (0.0132) (0.0115) ∆COL_INF(-1) 0.0677*** 0.0235*** 0.0184*** 0.0575** 0.0307 (0.0211) (0.00454) (0.00361) (0.0231) (0.0208) ∆COL_GDP(-1) 0.171*** -0.0248** -0.0202** 0.184*** 0.173*** (0.0557) (0.0105) (0.00836) (0.0611) (0.0531) ∆COL_GROSS(-1)  -0.0217*     (0.0131)    ∆COL_NET(-1)   -0.0209*     (0.0121)   ∆COL_OVERALL(-
1) 
   -0.0565*  
   (0.0302)  ∆COL_PRIMARY(-
1) 
    -0.0445* 
    (0.0249) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 147 152 152 148 (147) 152 (149) 
Lags 6 1 13 5 (6) 1 (4) 
Log Likelihood -110.895 -445.435 -468.912 -127.64 -179.095 
Serial Correlation 
Test 16.69 21.587 22.283 20.434 35.432 
P-value 0.406 0.66 0.62 0.724 0.081 
Skewness Test 3.757 582.122 625.351 10.13 26.285 
P-value 0.439 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.909 0.94 0.94 0.863 0.865 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 11. Colombia 5-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the 3-Month Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
COL_GB5YR 
COL_STIR_P -0.950*** -1.016*** -1.027*** -1.332*** -1.465*** (0.206) (0.300) (0.366) (0.240) (0.181) 
COL_INF -0.448* 0.615** 0.737** 0.0280 0.109 (0.232) (0.289) (0.341) (0.247) (0.170) 
COL_GDP -0.588*** 1.207*** 1.402*** -0.635*** -0.544*** (0.141) (0.132) (0.155) (0.125) (0.0922) 
COL_GROSS  0.255***     (0.0556)    
COL_NET   0.285***     (0.0694)   
COL_OVERALL    0.564**     (0.237)  
COL_PRIMARY     0.794***     (0.187) 
Constant 2.233 -19.77 -19.58 3.673 2.338 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆COL_GB5YR(-1) -0.106*** 0.0261** 0.0236** -0.136*** -0.169*** (0.0272) (0.0113) (0.00996) (0.0302) (0.0370) ∆COL_STIR_P(-1) -0.00114 0.0533*** 0.0468*** 0.0000950 0.00776 (0.0125) (0.00489) (0.00436) (0.0138) (0.0168) ∆COL_INF(-1) 0.0525** 0.0496*** 0.0436*** 0.0307 0.0382 (0.0211) (0.00824) (0.00731) (0.0246) (0.0306) ∆COL_GDP(-1) 0.169*** -0.0366* -0.0339* 0.187*** 0.249*** (0.0562) (0.0198) (0.0175) (0.0652) (0.0808) ∆COL_GROSS(-1)  -0.0462*     (0.0243)    ∆COL_NET(-1)   -0.0490*     (0.0251)   ∆COL_OVERALL(-
1) 
   -0.0619*  
   (0.0319)  ∆COL_PRIMARY(-
1) 
    -0.0807** 
    (0.0378) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 148 152 152 148 148 
Lags 5 1 1 5 5 
Log Likelihood -111.839 -420.954 -444.936 -131.746 -122.218 
Serial Correlation 
Test 24.358 22.595 21.631 32.332 35.473 
P-value 0.082 0.601 0.657 0.149 0.08 
Skewness Test 12.491 532.923 556.892 15.957 30.518 
P-value 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.916 0.946 0.946 0.877 0.882 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 12. Mexico 10-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the 3-Month Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
MEX_GB10YR 
MEX_STIR_P -0.673*** -1.074*** -1.319*** -3.270*** -2.803*** (0.0956) (0.279) (0.334) (0.483) (0.469) 
MEX_INF -0.246 -1.068* -1.012 0.0307 -1.239 (0.228) (0.578) (0.638) (0.693) (0.777) 
MEX_IP -0.0887 -0.868*** -0.926*** 0.00226 0.342 (0.0691) (0.192) (0.211) (0.201) (0.229) 
MEX_GROSS  -0.212**     (0.0979)    
MEX_NET   -0.235**     (0.110)   
MEX_OVERALL    4.774***     (0.781)  
MEX_PRIMARY     4.557***     (0.773) 
Constant -2.188 14.26 15.00 25.19 12.46 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆MEX_GB10YR(-1) -0.0451 0.0166 0.0184 0.0156 0.0102 (0.0361) (0.0150) (0.0137) (0.00996) (0.00915) ∆MEX_STIR_P(-1) 0.0500 -0.00278 0.00163 0.0428*** 0.0336*** (0.0347) (0.0128) (0.0117) (0.00783) (0.00732) ∆MEX_INF(-1) -0.0103 -0.00982 -0.00792 0.0245*** 0.0280*** (0.0277) (0.0117) (0.0107) (0.00762) (0.00683) ∆MEX_IP(-1) 0.299*** 0.137*** 0.116*** -0.0120 -0.0132 (0.0751) (0.0296) (0.0272) (0.0206) (0.0187) ∆MEX_GROSS(-1)  0.00477     (0.0312)    ∆MEX_NET(-1)   0.0134     (0.0247)   ∆MEX_OVERALL(-
1) 
   -0.00496  
   (0.00786)  ∆MEX_PRIMARY(-
1) 
    0.000734 
    (0.00840) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 196 197 (194) 197 (194) 194 194 
Lags 2 1 (4) 1 (4) 4 4 
Log Likelihood -454.118 -585.357 -559.209 -383.534 -416.932 
Serial Correlation 
Test 22.676 22.639 20.27 20.406 20.827 
P-value 0.123 0.54 0.732 0.725 0.707 
Skewness Test 25.395 410.04 260.611 204.191 27.827 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.903 0.872 0.867 0.808 0.856 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 13. Mexico 5-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the 3-Month Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
MEX_GB5YR 
MEX_STIR_P 0.0215 0.516*** 0.474*** -0.0299 -0.121 (0.105) (0.175) (0.163) (0.205) (0.209) 
MEX_INF -0.347*** -0.679*** -0.634*** -0.353*** -0.407*** (0.111) (0.187) (0.175) (0.117) (0.126) 
MEX_IP 0.0101 0.195* 0.161 0.00949 0.0461 (0.0508) (0.106) (0.0992) (0.0594) (0.0679) 
MEX_GROSS  0.105***     (0.0329)    
MEX_NET   0.104***     (0.0371)   
MEX_OVERALL    0.0631     (0.215)  
MEX_PRIMARY     0.230     (0.170) 
Constant -4.049 -11.02 -10.08 -3.565 -3.093 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆MEX_GB5YR(-1) -0.0702 -0.0123 -0.0164 -0.0653 -0.0483 (0.0475) (0.0273) (0.0295) (0.0468) (0.0415) ∆MEX_STIR_P(-1) 0.114*** 0.0688*** 0.0737*** 0.113*** 0.103*** (0.0180) (0.00987) (0.0108) (0.0176) (0.0154) ∆MEX_INF(-1) 0.146*** 0.0954*** 0.102*** 0.142*** 0.128*** (0.0488) (0.0272) (0.0294) (0.0480) (0.0424) ∆MEX_IP(-1) 0.0165 -0.00447 -0.00373 0.0180 0.0102 (0.0789) (0.0448) (0.0485) (0.0775) (0.0686) ∆MEX_GROSS(-1)  -0.108     (0.0730)    ∆MEX_NET(-1)   -0.127*     (0.0676)   ∆MEX_OVERALL(-
1) 
   0.0924**  
   (0.0384)  ∆MEX_PRIMARY(-
1) 
    0.102** 
    (0.0447) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 
Lags 1 1 1 1 1 
Log Likelihood -24.95 -115.895 -101.682 -23.903 -43.652 
Serial Correlation 
Test 19.935 30.415 28.782 20.502 19.395 
P-value 0.223 0.209 0.273 0.72 0.778 
Skewness Test 18.787 107.932 83.802 50.936 68.382 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.882 0.946 0.94 0.887 0.911 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Future Research Work 
In future research it would be worthwhile to encompass variables such as oil shocks and 
non-resident debt-holders ratio dummies. All three countries’ economies depend on oil 
revenues, so an indicator of oil price movements would certainly be a relevant variable. Non-
resident holders own a high share of Colombia and Mexico’s public domestic debt, thus, 
controlling for that could prove to be important for the future model estimations. Other variables 
such as exchange rates, credit flows, and financial volatility (e.g., VIX index) should also be 
considered. Future work may also include higher frequency data for the government finance 
variables. Impulse response functions could also be provided to detect the pace of the return of 
the underlying variables to long-run equilibrium. Finally, detecting the long-run dynamics by 
applying the Keynesian methodology ought to be applied to other set of countries with similar 
institutional framework and government bond markets. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY REMARKS 
 
During the past two decades, the central banks of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico have 
focused solely on achieving price stability by targeting inflation and inflation expectations. But 
in the same time period, the results from this dissertation show that Banco Central do Brasil, 
Banco de la Republica, and Banco de Mexico can exert strong influence on their respective 
government bond yields. Since the short-term interest rates are the main drivers of the long-term 
interest rates, and since the short-term interest rates follow central banks’ policy rates, it can be 
argued that the monetary authorities in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico can manage the yield 
curve. This dissertation reinvigorates the Keynesian view that a central bank’s actions, mainly 
through the influence of the policy rate on the short-term interest rates, affect government bond 
yields (Keynes 1930, [1936] 2007). 
Interest rates come into play for credit growth, whether it is households’ demand for 
loans and mortgages or firms’ investment credit demand. Thus, reducing the spread between the 
short rate and the long rate helps stabilize the interest rate term structure. A stable yield curve 
would also help to preserve the liquidity of the investors’ financial positions (Hannsgen 2005; 
Kregel 1998, 2003). In terms of government finance, results obtained from a number of the 
models for Colombia and Mexico indicate that deficit-and debt-to-GDP ratios have relatively 
	 81 
weak influence on the government bond yields. Moreover, for Brazil, an increase in the deficit 
and debt ratios leads to a decline in the long-term government bond yields. These results closely 
accord with the findings of Akram and Das (2014, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2018) and Akram and 
Li (2017a, 2017b, 2018), and are in agreement with recent developments in monetary 
macroeconomic theory and policy for countries with monetary sovereignty (see Bindseil 2004; 
Fullwiler 2008; Lavoie 2014; Sims 2013; Wray 2003, 2012; Woodfoord 2001). The results 
obtained in this dissertation are in contrast to the government “crowding out” arguments present 
in the mainstream literature (see Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane 2007; Baldacci and Kumar 2010; 
Cebula 2014; Grandes 2007; Gruber and Kamin 2012; Lam and Tokuoka 2011; Martinez, 
Tercenoa, and Teruelb 2013; Min et al. 2003; Paccagnini 2016; Perovic 2015; Poghosyan 2012). 
The results in this dissertation provide some evidence that, even in the Latin American 
emerging market economies, governments can lower the bond issuance costs regardless of the 
fiscal stance. This has positive fiscal policy implications because through proficient 
collaboration between the central banks and the Treasury departments, the countries of Brazil, 
Colombia, and Mexico can lengthen and smoothen the average maturity of their outstanding 
debt. A stable yield curve also enhances the robustness of the capital debt markets in the 
economies since it serves as a benchmark for pricing other financial instruments. Hence, 
understanding the main determinants of long-term government bond yields is relevant for fixed 
income investors and their portfolio allocation strategies in the local currency debt securities 
markets. Finally, this dissertation contributes to current discussions regarding the effectiveness 
of monetary policy, the implications of fiscal stance on long-term government bond yields, and 
the ongoing debates of government debt management and sustainability. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Figures 
Figure 1A. Scatterplots of the Government Bond Nominal Yields and the Central Bank 
Policy Rates 
Sources: Bloomberg Terminal; and author’s calculations. 
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Figure 2A. Scatterplots of Year-over-Year Percentage Point Changes in the Government 
Bond Nominal Yields and the Central Bank Policy Rates 
 
Sources: Bloomberg Terminal; and author’s calculations. 
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Figure 3A. Mexico Real GDP Growth and Industrial Production (YoY, %) 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, Production and Sales. 
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B. Tables 
Table B1. Brazil Multivariate Cointegration Trace Tests Using the Central Bank Policy 
Rate 
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic 5% Critical Value 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 49.0104 47.21 𝑟 = 1 23.2586* 29.68 𝑟 = 2 12.4439 15.41 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 83.7577 47.21 𝑟 = 1 21.0856* 29.68 𝑟 = 2 11.3254 15.41 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_GROSS); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 73.2135 68.52 𝑟 = 1 42.2307* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 18.8859 29.68 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_NET); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 71.1754 68.52 𝑟 = 1 44.8410* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 19.7194 29.68 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_OVERALL); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 70.8355 68.52 𝑟 = 1 39.5350* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 15.0184 29.68 
(BR_GB10YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_PRIMARY); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 104.2075 68.52 𝑟 = 1 28.2977* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 13.7721 29.68 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 97.1812 68.52 𝑟 = 1 34.2255* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 16.5080 29.68 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 102.5688 68.52 𝑟 = 1 37.5625* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 19.3542 29.68 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_OVERALL); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 109.9087 68.52 𝑟 = 1 32.1805* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 15.2392 29.68 
(BR_GB3YR, BR_STIR, BR_INF, BR_GDP, BR_PRIMARY); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 106.0108 68.52 𝑟 = 1 35.6405* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 13.8051 29.68 
Note: 𝑟 denotes the number of cointegrated vectors. The symbol * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table B2. Colombia Multivariate Cointegration Trace Tests Using the Central Bank 
Policy Rate 
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic 5% Critical Value 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 84.5793 47.21 𝑟 = 1 30.0610 29.68 𝑟 = 2 14.0242* 15.41 𝑟 = 3 5.9130 3.76 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 87.8268 47.21 𝑟 = 1 31.8217 29.68 𝑟 = 2 13.8614* 15.41 𝑟 = 3 6.0001 3.76 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 106.3738 68.52 𝑟 = 1 40.5882* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 23.4263 29.68 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 107.3633 68.52 𝑟 = 1 42.1624* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 24.3068 29.68 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_OVERALL); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 75.4070 68.52 𝑟 = 1 46.2758* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 22.2758 29.68 
(COL_GB10YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_PRIMARY); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 100.9597 68.52 𝑟 = 1 58.1795 47.21 𝑟 = 2 24.3031* 29.68 𝑟 = 3 12.4563 15.41 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 117.6255 68.52 𝑟 = 1 42.2076* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 22.2885 29.68 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 118.3555 68.52 𝑟 = 1 44.2859* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 23.5165 29.68 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_OVERALL); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 77.7118 68.52 𝑟 = 1 50.1303 47.21 𝑟 = 2 25.7875* 29.68 𝑟 = 3 10.2705 15.41 
(COL_GB5YR, COL_STIR, COL_INF, COL_GDP, COL_PRIMARY); Lag order=4 𝑟 = 0 77.4294 68.52 𝑟 = 1 50.7259 47.21 𝑟 = 2 25.1240* 29.68 𝑟 = 3 12.5578 15.41 
Note: 𝑟 denotes the number of cointegrated vectors. The symbol * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table B3. Mexico Multivariate Cointegration Trace Tests Using the Central Bank Policy 
Rate 
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic 5% Critical Value 
(MEX_GB10YR, MEX_STIR, MEX_INF, MEX_IP); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 73.7773 47.21 𝑟 = 1 33.8507 29.68 𝑟 = 2 10.2177* 15.41 𝑟 = 3 3.5940 3.76 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 56.100 47.21 𝑟 = 1 19.1095* 29.68 𝑟 = 2 8.8309 15.41 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 118.7646 68.52 𝑟 = 1 45.5984* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 13.2914 29.68 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 114.2709 68.52 𝑟 = 1 44.7886* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 12.1893 29.68 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _OVERALL); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 73.2892 68.52 𝑟 = 1 49.2170 47.21 𝑟 = 2 29.9767 29.68 𝑟 = 3 11.5768* 15.41 𝑟 = 4 2.4699 3.76 
(MEX _GB10YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _PRIMARY); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 77.0608 68.52 𝑟 = 1 44.7199* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 26.8552 29.68 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _GROSS); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 73.8923 68.52 𝑟 = 1 36.1798* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 14.3717 29.68 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _NET); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 73.8313 68.52 𝑟 = 1 35.7376* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 13.3011 29.68 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _OVERALL); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 143.296 68.52 𝑟 = 1 54.7794 47.21 𝑟 = 2 20.6953* 29.68 𝑟 = 3 11.5559 15.41 
(MEX _GB5YR, MEX _STIR, MEX _INF, MEX _IP, MEX _PRIMARY); Lag order=1 𝑟 = 0 88.9535 68.52 𝑟 = 1 46.7517* 47.21 𝑟 = 2 19.7669 29.68 
Note: 𝑟 denotes the number of cointegrated vectors. The symbol * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table B4. Brazil 10-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the Central Bank Policy 
Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
BR_GB10YR 
BR_STIR -0.608*** -0.837*** -0.913*** -0.754*** -0.553** (0.127) (0.179) (0.202) (0.199) (0.266) 
BR_INF 0.180 1.520*** 1.496*** 1.618*** 2.011*** (0.224) (0.374) (0.427) (0.391) (0.539) 
BR_GDP 0.0158 0.744*** 0.522*** 1.129*** 1.564*** (0.0871) (0.170) (0.160) (0.222) (0.327) 
BR_GROSS  0.120***     (0.0413)    
BR_NET   0.128**     (0.0540)   
BR_OVERALL    -0.686***     (0.173)  
BR_PRIMARY     -1.394***     (0.333) 
Constant -6.647 -22.16 -17.00 -18.97 -19.84 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆BR_GB10YR(-1) -0.161*** -0.119*** -0.117*** -0.0745*** -0.0640*** (0.0409) (0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0250) (0.0209) ∆BR_STIR(-1) 0.0471* 0.0184 0.0230 0.0148 0.0107 (0.0251) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0154) (0.0123) ∆BR_INF(-1) 0.000702 -0.0340* -0.0367** -0.0193 -0.0319** (0.0263) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0156) (0.0134) ∆BR_GDP(-1) 0.165* -0.0641 -0.00400 -0.101* -0.0650 (0.0870) (0.0596) (0.0610) (0.0525) (0.0434) ∆BR_GROSS(-1)  -0.0773     (0.0762)    ∆BR_NET(-1)   0.00483     (0.0869)   ∆BR_OVERALL(-1)    0.0744***     (0.0284)  ∆BR_PRIMARY(-1)     0.0218     (0.0141) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 138 138 138 138 141 (137) 
Lags 4 4 4 4 1 (5) 
Log Likelihood -297.286 -511.129 -523.740 -386.638 -290.423 
Serial Correlation 
Test 15.038 22.852 24.071 25.847 25.801 
P-value 0.522 0.586 0.515 0.416 0.418 
Skewness Test 8.923 486.387 170.951 519.354 246.309 
P-value 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.838 0.830 0.829 0.838 0.895 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B5. Brazil 3-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the Central Bank Policy 
Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
BR_GB3YR 
BR_STIR -0.793*** -0.803*** -0.739*** -1.006*** -0.968*** (0.131) (0.107) (0.0971) (0.166) (0.269) 
BR_INF 0.469** 0.442** 0.201 1.317*** 2.557*** (0.187) (0.189) (0.166) (0.331) (0.618) 
BR_GDP 0.119 0.190* 0.0608 0.895*** 1.953*** (0.0843) (0.104) (0.0774) (0.220) (0.427) 
BR_GROSS  0.00822     (0.0263)    
BR_NET   -0.0158     (0.0241)   
BR_OVERALL    -0.615***     (0.171)  
BR_PRIMARY     -1.900***     (0.466) 
Constant -5.832 -6.122 -3.713 -13.46 -19.06 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆BR_GB3YR(-1) -0.0890* 0.00980 0.00934 -0.197*** -0.110*** (0.0488) (0.0383) (0.0419) (0.0555) (0.0335) ∆BR_STIR(-1) 0.124*** 0.148*** 0.159*** 0.0324 0.00782 (0.0239) (0.0180) (0.0199) (0.0257) (0.0154) ∆BR_INF(-1) 0.00139 0.0847*** 0.0995*** -0.0280 -0.0403** (0.0267) (0.0224) (0.0242) (0.0310) (0.0187) ∆BR_GDP(-1) -0.0435 -0.117*** -0.117** -0.0774 -0.0508 (0.0560) (0.0431) (0.0473) (0.0611) (0.0367) ∆BR_GROSS(-1)  0.00931     (0.0903)    ∆BR_NET(-1)   0.123     (0.0976)   ∆BR_OVERALL(-1)    0.124**     (0.0588)  ∆BR_PRIMARY(-1)     0.0347*     (0.0193) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 102 (101) 102 102 102 (99) 102 (99) 
Lags 1 (2) 1 1 1 (4) 1 (4) 
Log Likelihood -212.889 -410.862 -406.760 -242.175 -189.118 
Serial Correlation 
Test 20.241 33.472 34.159 29.007 20.561 
P-value 0.209 0.119 0.105 0.264 0.717 
Skewness Test 21.938 299.106 280.196 82.543 193.104 
P-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.906 0.906 0.903 0.892 0.885 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B6. Colombia 10-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the Central Bank 
Policy Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
COL_GB10YR 
COL_STIR -3.863*** -1.022* -2.704*** -4.335*** -3.883*** (0.673) (0.584) (0.587) (1.048) (0.841) 
COL_INF 2.180*** 1.111* 1.025* 2.259** 1.973** (0.689) (0.579) (0.582) (1.056) (0.813) 
COL_GDP 0.168 2.231*** 0.0754 -0.135 -0.206 (0.406) (0.280) (0.369) (0.558) (0.431) 
COL_GROSS  0.386***     (0.0883)    
COL_NET   0.0855     (0.0836)   
COL_OVERALL    0.0814     (0.802)  
COL_PRIMARY     0.586     (0.702) 
Constant 1.127 -32.18 -1.429 4.320 3.389 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆COL_GB10YR(-1) -0.0375*** 0.0129 -0.0458*** -0.0214* -0.0286** (0.0125) (0.00920) (0.0159) (0.0111) (0.0137) ∆COL_STIR(-1) 0.0341*** 0.0384*** 0.0424*** 0.0255*** 0.0305*** (0.00793) (0.00538) (0.00981) (0.00612) (0.00744) ∆COL_INF(-1) 0.000702 0.0354*** 0.0147 0.00190 0.00189 (0.0263) (0.00615) (0.0110) (0.00752) (0.00929) ∆COL_GDP(-1) 0.0455* -0.0333** 0.0600** 0.0389** 0.0494** (0.0235) (0.0145) (0.0299) (0.0188) (0.0232) ∆COL_GROSS(-1)  -0.0168     (0.0188)    ∆COL_NET(-1)   0.0419     (0.0495)   ∆COL_OVERALL(-
1) 
   -0.00177  
   (0.00972)  ∆COL_PRIMARY(-
1) 
    -0.00615 
    (0.0113) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 128 (124) 128 128 (124) 125 125 
Lags 1 (5) 1 1 (5) 4 4 
Log Likelihood -148.608 -418.923 -322.326 -204.810 -194.236 
Serial Correlation 
Test 16.083 35.906 22.556 32.271 33.849 
P-value 0.447 0.073 0.545 0.15 0.111 
Skewness Test 29.843 658.286 496.629 39.438 25.721 
P-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Highest Modulus 0.888 0.932 0.911 0.893 0.896 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B7. Colombia 5-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the Central Bank 
Policy Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
COL_GB5YR 
COL_STIR -2.933*** -2.216*** -1.884*** 0.603 -0.200 (0.561) (0.475) (0.452) (0.610) (0.485) 
COL_INF 1.331** 0.684 0.326 -1.906*** -1.147** (0.574) (0.475) (0.453) (0.615) (0.468) 
COL_GDP -0.104 0.176 -0.0386 -1.392*** -1.080*** (0.338) (0.316) (0.291) (0.326) (0.249) 
COL_GROSS  0.129*     (0.0669)    
COL_NET   0.115*     (0.0664)   
COL_OVERALL    0.120     (0.470)  
COL_PRIMARY     0.228     (0.402) 
Constant 1.971 -4.731 -2.409 3.445 2.725 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆COL_GB5YR(-1) -0.0240 -0.0198 -0.0282 -0.0562*** -0.0742*** (0.0165) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0172) (0.0220) ∆COL_STIR(-1) 0.0411*** 0.0557*** 0.0532*** -0.0244** -0.0143 (0.0111) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0110) (0.0142) ∆COL_INF(-1) 0.00368 0.0847*** 0.0202 0.00650 0.00991 (0.0126) (0.0224) (0.0162) (0.0129) (0.0167) ∆COL_GDP(-1) 0.0886*** 0.0144 0.115** 0.0777** 0.122*** (0.0336) (0.0152) (0.0448) (0.0334) (0.0427) ∆COL_GROSS(-1)  0.0457     (0.0574)    ∆COL_NET(-1)   0.0653     (0.0733)   ∆COL_OVERALL(-
1) 
   -0.0287*  
   (0.0172)  ∆COL_PRIMARY(-
1) 
    -0.0359* 
    (0.0212) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 128 (124) 128 (124) 128 (124) 125 125 
Lags 1 (5) 1 (5) 1 (5) 4 4 
Log Likelihood -136.447 -287.012 -306.318 33.191 -180.656 
Serial Correlation 
Test 20.891 24.44 22.338 50.286 33.312 
P-value 0.183 0.494 0.616 0.126 0.123 
Skewness Test 42.851 507.98 426.874 50.286 41.461 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.908 0.914 0.93 0.899 0.883 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B8. Mexico 10-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the Central Bank 
Policy Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
MEX_GB10YR 
MEX_STIR -0.93*** -1.689*** -2.260*** -3.446*** 1.116* (0.127) (0.252) (0.358) (0.721) (0.590) 
MEX_INF 0.509** 1.113*** 1.425*** 0.320 1.785*** (0.2) (0.319) (0.398) (0.548) (0.595) 
MEX_IP -0.052 -0.287*** -0.349*** 0.130 -0.491*** (0.06) (0.109) (0.130) (0.154) (0.180) 
MEX_GROSS  -0.218***     (0.0557)    
MEX_NET   -0.304***     (0.0746)   
MEX_OVERALL    4.581***     (0.974)  
MEX_PRIMARY     -3.826***     (0.802) 
Constant -5.089 7.746 11.51 23.08 -18.88 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆MEX_GB10YR(-1) -0.827*** -0.0686** -0.0459** -0.00494 -0.0261 (0.133) (0.0286) (0.0232) (0.0235) (0.0160) ∆MEX_STIR(-1) -0.0322 -0.0340*** -0.0257*** 0.0309*** -0.0250*** (0.0236) (0.0123) (0.00992) (0.00892) (0.00628) ∆MEX_INF(-1) 0.583*** -0.0804*** -0.0677*** 0.00477 -0.0320** (0.219) (0.0222) (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0126) ∆MEX_IP(-1) 0.0631 0.0930* 0.0799* -0.0194 0.0490* (0.0618) (0.0555) (0.0449) (0.0418) (0.0292) ∆MEX_GROSS(-1)  0.0498     (0.0673)    ∆MEX_NET(-1)   0.0826*     (0.0468)   ∆MEX_OVERALL(-
1) 
   -0.0489**  
   (0.0208)  ∆MEX_PRIMARY(-
1) 
    0.000931 
    (0.0180) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 131 (130) 131 (128) 131 (128) 131 (127) 131 (128) 
Lags 1 (2) 1 (4) 1 (4) 1 (5) 1 (4) 
Log Likelihood -187.276 -260.839 -241.512 -119.235 -158.724 
Serial Correlation 
Test 32.254 18.712 17.219 22.818 25.012 
P-value 0.009 0.811 0.873 0.588 0.462 
Skewness Test 28.47 396.854 237.802 30.148 4.404 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.493 
Highest Modulus 0.889 0.901 0.902 0.889 0.895 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table B9. Mexico 5-Year Bond Yield Johansen VEC Model Using the Central Bank Policy 
Rate 
 Model (1) Model (2a) Model (2b) Model (2c) Model (2d) 
MEX_GB5YR 
MEX_STIR 0.0356 0.150 0.0600 -0.0194 -0.145 (0.140) (0.158) (0.139) (0.248) (0.244) 
MEX_INF -0.352** -0.421** -0.367** -0.340** -0.356** (0.145) (0.166) (0.147) (0.134) (0.139) 
MEX_IP 0.0579 0.102 0.0649 0.0143 0.0452 (0.0673) (0.0938) (0.0837) (0.0675) (0.0746) 
MEX_GROSS  0.0152     (0.0293)    
MEX_NET   -0.00241     (0.0313)   
MEX_OVERALL    -0.0328     (0.256)  
MEX_PRIMARY     0.142     (0.196) 
Constant -4.131 -5.572 -4.436 -4.011 -3.261 
Error correction terms (ECT) ∆MEX_GB5YR(-1) -0.0823* -0.0636 -0.0835* -0.0825 -0.0663 (0.0477) (0.0422) (0.0470) (0.0504) (0.0465) ∆MEX_STIR(-1) 0.101*** 0.0903*** 0.0979*** 0.108*** 0.107*** (0.0258) (0.0227) (0.0256) (0.0272) (0.0246) ∆MEX_INF(-1) 0.149*** 0.140*** 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.137*** (0.0491) (0.0430) (0.0484) (0.0521) (0.0479) ∆MEX_IP(-1) 0.00354 -0.00318 0.00167 0.0182 0.00924 (0.0795) (0.0702) (0.0786) (0.0839) (0.0772) ∆MEX_GROSS(-1)  -0.122     (0.115)    ∆MEX_NET(-1)   -0.149     (0.111)   ∆MEX_OVERALL(-
1) 
   0.108***  
   (0.0413)  ∆MEX_PRIMARY(-
1) 
    0.123** 
    (0.0500) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 
Lags 1 1 1 1 1 
Log Likelihood -50.964 -144.064 -129.247 -49.326 -69.278 
Serial Correlation 
Test 16.886 24.095 20.848 17.514 25.225 
P-value 0.393 0.514 0.701 0.862 0.449 
Skewness Test 5.656 105.405 82.684 16.305 29.376 
P-value 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 
Highest Modulus 0.869 0.889 0.868 0.862 0.887 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
